The Safety Card
Post by CatalinaNJB
The Safety Card is played when data
does not support an opinion of a decision maker or when safety is not
comprehended. The Safety Card is when safety becomes the driving force of
operations without considering Residual Risk, which is the remaining risk level
that exists after all selected risk control techniques have been implemented or
without considering the Substitute Risk, which is the safety risk level that
exists of new hazards identified by the introduction of a risk control. The
Safety Card is played when safety is not defined, measured or when operational
pressure is applied from a third party or social media.
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| The Safety Card is effective when applied to one event only |
After major aircraft accidents,
there is a public outcry, and rightfully so, for airlines to improve safety. The aviation authorities are scrambling to
make new rules to protect the flying public and everyone is alleging that
flying is safer than driving a vehicle. Ever since the first flight new rules
and regulations have been put in place to improve safety and make flying the
utopia of safe travel. But it’s not certain that more regulations make flying
safer.
A quote from Transport Canada:
"Traditionally, in rail and in other safety-critical industries,
safety had been pursued through compliance with prescriptive rules and
regulations. In the 1990s, however, advancements in safety research
demonstrated that organizations could be compliant with prescriptive
regulations, yet still be unsafe. More specifically, compliance did not
necessarily mean effectively managing risks."
Leonardo da Vinci was a pioneer in
aviation and 400 years ahead of his time. Below are two of his quotes: “For once you have tasted flight you will
walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards, for there you have been and
there you will long to return.”, and “Anyone
who conducts an argument by appealing to authority is not using his
intelligence; he is just using his memory.”
When combining these quotes, they
become a description of aviation safety and the Safety Management System as we
know it. Regulatory compliance is not safety risk assessments and it takes
intelligence to assess risks, manage, lead and continuous improve aviation
safety. Regulatory compliance is to rely on memory, while intelligence to lead
with operational safety processes and the ability to learn or understand or to
deal with new or trying situations. When applying memory to SMS the task of
memorizing regulations does not challenge operations or assessing risks, while applying
intelligence, or human factors, operations are challenged and safety risk
levels are assigned.
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| Customer Satisfaction is loyalty, safety and accountability to the flying public. |
SMS
is data collection and to learn and understand what story the data is telling.
Aviation safety is to apply data collected, which is the product of elements
with a purpose to generate information, acquire knowledge and develop
comprehension for training, competencies and communication within a Safety
Promotion System. The public opinion of aviation safety is based on the outcome
of the flight and not on input processes. This is how it must
be addressed by the public, who should not have to analyze any data to raise
their voice and opinion of safety when flying. An airline only has one option
when it comes to manage safety in flying, which is to view their operations
from the point of view of a passenger and the public opinion. An effective SMS
is where the safety policy and primary objective is to provide a high-quality
level of customer service and apply this as a tool for excellence in level of
safety. It is impossible to provide a high-quality level of customer service
without excellence in operations of a safety management system.
When applying this concept of a
customer satisfaction based approach to safety there could be a conflict
between the quality-level accepted by a customer and operational control. Opinions
based demands from third-parties, customers, social media or an aviation
authority could develop unintended hazards and affect safety decisions. Several
years ago, and long before SMS became regulated, or accepted as a value-added
level of safety in aviation, an operator developed a customer satisfaction
based safety management system. The concept of this system was to measure the
level of safety from the point of view of customer satisfaction and apply
data-based decision tools to operational control. This system functioned for
several years until it was decided to apply safety as the primary driving force
into operations. While customer satisfaction could be measured, analysed and
defined, the concept of safety could not easily be defined or comprehended. The
Safety Card was applied equally to all aspects of operations without defining
safety critical areas to measure. This opinion based decision to change a word
from “customer” to “safety” caused a drift in operational control and drift of
processes effectiveness. Introducing the word “safety” to operations does not
improve safety unless decisions are based on factual data.
CatalinaNJB
