Why SMS?
By CatalinaMJB
A Blog Analysis Of Aviation SMS
This
same question is being asked by operators over and over again: “Why does the Global Aviation Industry,
being Airlines or Airports, need a Safety Management System (SMS) today, when
they were safe yesterday without an SMS?” There are many great safety tools
within an SMS program, but SMS does not provide an answer to the question
itself.
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| SMS is the process of performing while avoiding reverse at high speed. |
SMS
was sold to the aviation industry as being the perfect reactive safety process
and they fell for it. Reactive measures were how safety was improved in the old
days, ever since Orville Wright’s first flight. So, if operating with an SMS
does not prevent accidents or improve safety, why are we doing it? If SMS was
not viewed as the perfect safety tool, the Regulator would accept a frequency
of fatal aviation accidents, just like they accept accidents on the road for
small vehicles and big-trucks. But they don’t. This does not in any way, shape
or form imply that the Aviation Industry, the Regulator or the Public must accept
any aviation accidents, but rather that the Regulator by implementing SMS, have
accepted the inherent risk in flying that goes beyond the capability of regulating
safety in operational control.
In
December of 2017 there was another fatal accident when an SMS airline crashed
shortly after the aircraft became airborne. One reason for the crash is that
SMS is still working in the concept of possibility and have not yet moved into
flight-specific probability. With a bush-pilot approach to departure, where the
probability for a successful takeoff is assessed, a pre-takeoff probability
analysis would have pre-determined the outcome. SMS is detailed hard work and
analysis of each pre-flight and not a trend analysis of past performance.
The
TSB report from the accident back in December of 2017 states that “…taking off with contamination on critical
surfaces is a deviation that has become normalized. Therefore, providing adequate
de-icing and anti-icing equipment may not be sufficient to reduce the
likelihood of aircraft taking off with contaminated critical surfaces.” This
TSB report actually states that both airport or airline operators accept lower
standards than what’s in their SMS manual by allowing for contaminated aircraft
to depart. This event parallels the Dryden accident, where flight attendants or
passengers were not allowed to question the Captain’s decision. Airport
operators do not see it as their role in safety to promote the clean aircraft
concept. With the implementation of SMS software and SMS paperwork the emotions
of human factors have been removed from the equation to a point where safety is
no longer paramount, but a check-box task.
When
there is adequate de-icing equipment in place, TSB reports that airlines are
rejecting to use their equipment and airport operators makes equipment
unavailable by blocking it with snowbanks. SMS was intended to build bridges
and remove silos. The TSB report shows that gaps between airport and airline
safety has become wider over the years since SMS was implemented.
SMS
has become its own worst enemy when airlines and airports do not comprehend the
fact that SMS is more specialized than what they can ever imagine and more than
they can manage themselves. Airports and
airlines have personnel and position filled to ensure that all checkboxes are
filled in and that the Regulator accepts their documentation, but they are
operating without comprehending the SMS. This is simply stated in the TSB
report as “…deviation that has become
normalized “. The SMS hierarchy itself by the position of the Accountable
executive (AE) makes it difficult to allow comprehension of SMS since the AE is
too far removed from the operations itself. The AE might be regulatory required
to accept SMS, but if the AE does not comprehend SMS this will trickle down in
the organization. E.g. if the AE does not believe in training, this attitude
will filter throughout the organizations, or if the AE has not developed the SMS
leadership skills this will also trickle down in the organization. AE might be
regulated to comprehend SMS, but this does not ensure an operational sound SMS
program.
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| SMS today is to the AE what an empty wallet to a financial advisor |
An
effective SMS operation needs to implement and operate with an emotionally independent
specialty team. This is a team of operational, but independent, integrated
personnel to ensure SMS project planning and quality leadership. It’s vital for
a successful SMS that airlines and airports comprehend why they need an SMS
today, when they were safe yesterday without an SMS. This question is not going
away. If they are looking for a quick-fix and one-fit-all answer they are
searching in someone else’s haystack. If they don’t think this is a valid question,
they already took the wrong turn at the fork in the road. Since there still are
accidents after SMS, the key to the answer is not about safety but about
probability. The answer is found in the position contracts established by the organizational
chart and in the accountable executive’s opinion. It’s a myth that airports and
airlines were safe yesterday and that’s the reason we need SMS with Quality
Leadership today.
CatalinaNJB
