COVID-19 AND BIRDS

 COVID-19 AND BIRDS

By OffRoadPilots

An examination of Canadian aircraft-movement and reported bird-strike

data indicates that the total number of bird strikes declined during the

COVID-19 period, while the number of strikes relative to aircraft activity

increased. Between August 1, 2016, and February 29, 2020, approximately

20,159,460 aircraft movements and 3,378 bird strikes were recorded. This

represents about 1.68 reported bird strikes per 10,000 aircraft movements.

Between March 1, 2020, and February 28, 2021, aircraft activity declined to

approximately 3,558,839 movements, while 952 bird strikes were recorded.

Although the absolute number of strikes was lower, the COVID-period rate

increased to approximately 2.68 strikes per 10,000 movements. The

exposure-adjusted bird-strike rate was therefore about 60 percent higher

during COVID-19 than during the pre-COVID period.

These results demonstrate why absolute numbers should not be

considered independently from operational exposure. The reduction from

3,378 strikes before COVID-19 to 952 during the selected COVID-19 period

could initially be interpreted as an improvement. However, the two periods

are of different lengths, and aircraft activity declined substantially during

the pandemic. When strikes are measured against movements, the data

present a different safety picture. Aircraft were involved in fewer strikesoverall, but each movement was exposed to a higher reported strike rate.

The reduced strike total therefore should not automatically be treated as

evidence that the underlying wildlife hazard was reduced.

COVID-19 created exceptional operational conditions at Canadian airports.

Commercial passenger traffic declined sharply, schedules were reduced,

and some aviation activities were suspended. At the same time, birds and

other wildlife continued to occupy and move through airport environments.

Reduced aircraft activity, vehicle traffic, construction, maintenance, noise,

and human presence may have made some airfield areas more attractive

to wildlife. Grasslands, drainage areas, standing water, food sources,

insects, nesting sites, and nearby waste or agricultural activities remained

capable of attracting birds even when aircraft movements declined. The

wildlife hazard did not necessarily decrease at the same rate as aviation

activity.

The higher ratio may also reflect limitations placed on airport personnel

during the pandemic. Public-health requirements, staffing reductions,

isolation rules, restricted access, modified shifts, physical-distancing

procedures, and financial pressures may have reduced the time that

qualified personnel could spend on the airfield. Some employees may havebeen assigned only to functions considered immediately essential. Wildlife-

control patrols, habitat inspections, grass management, drainage checks,

dispersal activities, carcass searches, fence inspections, and follow-up

investigations may consequently have been reduced, delayed, or performed

less consistently.

Functioning Safety

Management System

should identify such

operational changes

through hazard

identification and

management-of-change

processes. COVID-19 was

not merely a public-health

issue; it represented a

major change to airport staffing, supervision, traffic composition,

contractor availability, maintenance capacity, and airfield access. An

effective SMS should have assessed how these changes could influence

wildlife hazards and should have introduced temporary controls. These

controls could have included minimum wildlife-patrol requirements, revised

inspection schedules, prioritized habitat management, alternate staffing

arrangements, increased pilot reporting, and regular review of strike rates

per aircraft movement.

Pandemics were not considered . A Safety Management System is the organizational framework intended to recognize hazards, assess risk, implement controls, and verify whether

those controls remain effective. A defensible conclusion is that restrictions

affecting the people responsible for operating the SMS and completing

airfield work may have weakened some wildlife-risk controls. If staffing and

access restrictions prevented personnel from conducting normalinspections, dispersal, maintenance, reporting, and assurance activities, the practical effectiveness of the SMS could have been diminished, even though documented policies and procedures remained in place.

An SMS cannot manage wildlife only through manuals, forms, meetings, or

computer records. Its effectiveness depends on trained people being able

to observe conditions, enter the movement area, recognize changing

wildlife behaviour, remove attractants, disperse birds, report hazards, and

confirm that corrective actions work. When personnel are restricted from

performing these duties, there can be a gap between the SMS as

documented and the SMS as actually implemented. During COVID-19, this

gap may have allowed hazards to develop or remain uncontrolled for longer

periods, contributing to a higher strike rate per movement.

The change in traffic composition should also be considered. During the

pandemic, local movements, flight training, cargo operations, medical

flights, and other essential activities did not necessarily decline at the same

rate as scheduled passenger services. Different aircraft types, routes,

operating times, runway-use patterns, and flight profiles may have different

wildlife exposure. A larger proportion of local circuits, for example, could

produce repeated exposure to the airport environment. Consequently, the

higher ratio may reflect both reduced wildlife-control capacity and changes

in the kinds of movements that continued during the pandemic.

Reporting practices represent another possible influence. If pilots, air

operators, or airport personnel became more attentive to wildlife during

reduced traffic, a larger proportion of strikes may have been reported.

Conversely, staffing disruptions could have reduced reporting or carcass

detection.This experience provides an important SMS lesson. A major reduction in

operations does not necessarily produce a proportional reduction in risk.

When activity decreases, management may assume that fewer flights

require fewer safety resources. The COVID-19 data suggest that this

assumption can be misleading. Wildlife hazards can remain constant or

intensify while the operational denominator declines. Safety resources

should therefore be based on the condition and persistence of the hazard,

rather than solely on traffic volume. Minimum airfield surveillance and

wildlife-management capability should be maintained whenever aircraft

continue operating.

It is reasonable to conclude that bird-strike numbers were reduced during

COVID-19, while the reported bird-strike rate increased from approximately

1.68 to 2.68 strikes per 10,000 movements. This increase may have been

influenced by reduced human presence and restrictions that limited normal

wildlife-control and airfield-maintenance activities.

The aviation industry can improve its Safety Management System by

treating pandemics and other long-term emergencies as foreseeable

operational changes rather than temporary interruptions. Emergency

planning should identify the safety functions that must continue regardless

of passenger volume, staffing pressures, public-health restrictions, or

financial conditions. Wildlife monitoring and control should be classified as

essential airfield activities because birds remain present even when aircraft

movements decline.

Each airport should establish minimum service levels for wildlife patrols,

runway inspections, dispersal activities, carcass searches, grass cutting,

drainage maintenance, waste control, and fence inspections. These

requirements should be based on wildlife risk, seasonal migration, habitatconditions, and aircraft exposure—not only on the number of scheduled

flights. Qualified backup personnel should be trained in advance, and

agreements with neighbouring airports, contractors, or government

agencies should provide additional support when regular employees are

unavailable.

The management-of-

change process should be

activated as soon as an

emergency affects

staffing, airfield access,

traffic composition,

maintenance, or contractor

availability. A documented

Risk assessment should

determine how each

restriction could weaken

existing wildlife controls.

Any reduced inspection or patrol must be formally assessed, authorized,

time limited, and supported by alternative measures. Managers should

regularly review whether temporary controls remain effective instead of

allowing emergency arrangements to become normal practice.

Pandemics were considered.

Airports should monitor both the number of wildlife strikes and the rate per

10,000 aircraft movements. Monthly rates should be compared with

equivalent seasons and historical limits. The analysis should separate

local, itinerant, commercial, cargo, and training movements where practical

because different operations create different exposure. Leading indicators

should include patrol completion, wildlife observations, dispersal

responses, habitat deficiencies, overdue maintenance, and time required to

close corrective actions.Technology can support continuity through remote cameras, radar,

acoustic detection, drones where authorized, digital inspection records, and

automatic alerts. However, technology should supplement, not replace,

trained personnel who can inspect conditions, interpret wildlife behaviour,

and take immediate action.

Reporting systems must remain accessible during emergencies. Pilots, air

traffic services, maintenance staff, and contractors should receive

simplified procedures for reporting strikes, near strikes, wildlife

concentrations, and unavailable controls. Regular virtual safety meetings

can help share emerging trends among airports and operators.

Senior management should define clear authority, resources,

communication channels, and escalation thresholds so frontline personnel

can respond without unnecessary administrative delay.

Emergency exercises should include prolonged staff shortages and

restricted airfield access, not just short-duration events. After each

exercise or real emergency, the organization should document lessons,

update its wildlife-management plan, and verify corrective actions through

safety assurance. The central principle is that reduced traffic does not

necessarily mean reduced risk. A resilient SMS preserves essential human

capability, continuously measures exposure, and adapts wildlife controls

before temporary restrictions create a lasting safety weakness.

OffRoadPilots

SMS AND VIKING VOYAGES

SMS AND VIKING VOYAGES

By OffRoadPilots

An Aviation Safety Management System (SMS) provides a structured way

to identify hazards, assess risks, introduce controls, and determine whether

those controls work. Its purpose is to support sound decisions before harm

occurs and improve operations through continuous learning. The Vikings

called their SMS “Sail My Seas”. Viking voyages offer a useful historical

analogy: crews crossed unfamiliar waters where weather, navigation,

vessel condition, supplies, and human judgment could determine survival.

Applying SMS principles to those journeys illustrates how leadership and

organized learning can strengthen safety. This is a hypothetical

comparison, rather than a claim that Vikings operated a formal SMS

resembling modern aviation systems.

The Vikings’ extensive voyages demonstrate the importance of managing

uncertainty. Norse expansion across the North Atlantic connected distant

communities and reached places including Iceland, Greenland, and North

America. Such journeys required practical seamanship and adaptation to

demanding environments. However, reaching a destination would not

necessarily prove that every decision was sound. A vessel could survive

despite weaknesses in planning or preparation. Aviation organizations facethe same problem when successful flights conceal deteriorating safety

margins. SMS encourages leaders to examine how an operation succeeded

and whether its success can be repeated safely under different

circumstances.

Leadership would be the starting point for a Viking SMS. The expedition

leader would establish that protecting people and preserving the vessel

were essential responsibilities. Departure decisions would consider

readiness alongside commercial ambitions, exploration goals, and

seasonal pressures. Crew members would understand their duties,

reporting arrangements, and authority to raise concerns. In aviation,

executives similarly need to provide resources and support operational

decisions consistent with safety objectives. 

A policy becomes meaningful when leaders accept delays, repairs, or changes to plans because available evidence shows that proceeding would expose people to unacceptable

risk.Hazard identification would begin before departure and continue

throughout each voyage. Viking crews could examine damaged planking,

worn rigging, unstable cargo, insufficient drinking water, inexperienced

sailors, and uncertain landing conditions. They could also identify external

hazards such as storms, fog, cold water, rocky shorelines, and limited

shelter. The aviation equivalent includes aircraft defects, runway

contamination, adverse weather, fatigue, and inadequate operational

information. Identifying a hazard does not require an accident. A small leak,

confusing instruction, or repeated navigation disagreement can reveal a

developing problem while there is still time to intervene.

Risk assessment would help distinguish manageable concerns from

conditions requiring immediate action. A weakened sail might create

limited difficulty near shelter but become critical during a long ocean

crossing. Its significance depends on exposure, available alternatives, and

the possible consequences of failure. Viking leaders could compare those

factors before choosing to sail, repair, reduce cargo, or change routes.

Aviation SMS applies similar reasoning when evaluating hazards within a

particular operation. Risk ratings should guide discussion and decisions,

while uncertainty, interacting hazards, and the limits of available evidence

remain visible to those accepting the risk.

Risk controls would need to match the actual danger. Viking measures

could include inspecting hulls and rigging, securing cargo, carrying repair

materials, preserving supply reserves, and choosing departure conditions

appropriate to the vessel and crew. Assigning experienced sailors to critical

duties would provide another protective measure. Aviation uses

comparable layers through maintenance, training, operating procedures,

weather assessment, and contingency planning. Several controls can

strengthen resilience, but their independence matters. Multiple precautionsoffer little protection when all depend on one exhausted person recognizing

the same warning at the same moment.

Human factors would deserve particular attention. Cold, hunger, fatigue,

fear, and social pressure could reduce a sailor’s ability to observe

conditions and make sound decisions. A respected leader might

unintentionally discourage disagreement, especially if hesitation appeared

inconsistent with courage. An SMS approach would make speaking up part

of competent seamanship. Aviation crews likewise need working

conditions that support alertness, communication, and constructive

challenge. Courage should include acknowledging uncertainty and

requesting assistance. Confidence is useful when supported by

competence; it becomes hazardous when authority prevents others from

questioning assumptions or reporting deterioration.

Reporting would turn individual observations into shared knowledge. After

a voyage, crews could discuss unexpected currents, damaged equipment,

supply shortages, navigational uncertainty, and difficult approaches toshore. Successful journeys would also deserve review, particularly when

survival depended on improvisation or favourable conditions. Aviation

organizations can learn similarly from hazards, incidents, diversions, and

other operational experiences. A fair reporting environment encourages

honest accounts while retaining accountability for deliberate misconduct.

Reports need timely responses and practical follow through, so personnel

can see that their information contributes to better decisions and safer

working conditions.

Investigation would look beyond the final mistake. If a vessel approached

dangerous rocks, asking only who steered would miss potential

weaknesses in lookout duties, fatigue management, route knowledge, or

leadership instructions. The useful question would be why the crew’s

protections failed to detect and correct the danger. Aviation investigations

benefit from the same systems perspective. Corrective action should

address underlying conditions rather than depend entirely on reminders to

be careful. Otherwise, the organization may replace one person while

leaving the circumstances that could expose another person to the same

failure.

Safety assurance would establish whether improvements worked. Viking

leaders could compare recurring defects, supply consumption, injuries, and

difficulties reported across successive voyages. They could check whether

inspections actually detected damage and whether revised preparations

reduced problems. Aviation organizations use monitoring, reviews, and

audits to evaluate operational controls. An absence of accidents alone

provides limited assurance, especially where activity is infrequent or

consequences are rare. Managers need evidence that safeguards function

during everyday operations and that corrective actions remain effective

after initial attention fades.Training and knowledge sharing would preserve learning beyond a single crew. 

Experienced sailors could demonstrate repairs, explain warning

signs, rehearse emergencies, and prepare less experienced members for

demanding duties. Oral teaching and practical demonstration could serve

this purpose without assuming modern documentation existed. Aviation

adds controlled procedures, records, and formal instruction, but the

objective remains transferable understanding. Personnel should know why

precautions matter and how to respond when circumstances change,

rather than simply memorize instructions.

Change would require renewed assessment. A different vessel, unfamiliar

route, heavier cargo, or inexperienced crew could invalidate assumptions

drawn from earlier voyages. Modern aviation faces comparable changes in

equipment, staffing, destinations, and schedules. Before proceeding,

leaders should examine new hazards, confirm resources, and decide

whether existing controls remain adequate.Emergency preparation would also matter. Crews could assign responsibilities for taking in water, losing steering control, or seeking

shelter. Aviation organizations similarly need coordinated responses to

foreseeable emergencies, supported by practice and clear communication.

Preparation improves the ability to respond effectively when prevention

proves insufficient.

The central lesson is that achievement and safety require continuing

human judgment. SMS could have helped Viking voyagers organize

experience, challenge risky assumptions, and protect future expeditions.

For aviation leaders, its value lies in making hazards visible, supporting

responsible decisions, and verifying that protections work. Technology can

assist this process, but people must remain accountable for understanding

conditions and acting before preventable harm occurs.

Viking voyagers can be understood as practising an early, informal

equivalent of an SMS (Sail My Seas) by sharing their experiences with

others preparing to sail. Knowledge about dangerous waters, changing

weather, ship weaknesses, crew fatigue, and unfamiliar destinations could

help the next crew recognize hazards and make better decisions. Sharing

both successful practices and mistakes turned individual experience into

collective learning. Although this was not a formal SMS in today’s sense, it

illustrates an enduring safety principle: lessons from one voyage can help

protect those setting out on the next.

OffRoadPilots