Monday, May 3, 2021

Teamwork Simplified

 Teamwork Simplified

By Catalina9

In aviation, both airlines and airports, teamwork is the foundation for an organization to function within a Safety Management System (SMS). A common expectation is that everyone must unconditionally “take one for the team” for the team to win or succeed. When someone “take one for the team” they are expected to willingly undertake an unpleasant task or make a personal sacrifice for the collective benefit of one's friends or colleagues. Should someone reject this notion that it is moral or necessarily for them to sacrifice their emotions, they will more than likely be kicked off the team. 

A scale is balanced by the SMS policy.
 Conventional wisdom is that there is “no I in team”.   This is as far from the fact that it could be. There will   always be an “I” in a team. The “I” could be by their   position of authority, by their vocabulary, by their   technical expertise or simply by their reputation within   the organization. Until the Safety Management System   came along, it was the “I” in the team who had control   over the masses. They would use the “safety card” and   imply that anyone who opposed their opinion of safety   were against safety and should be silenced in the   conversation. Playing the “safety card” is when   someone is making references to safety as a tool to   further their opinions and gain control of the conversation. An operational plan in aviation is called the safety management system for that exact reason. A safety management system in aviation is not about safety, but about process design, management, and oversight. The outcome of these SMS tasks are expected reduce, or even eliminate unexpected events and therefore we are safe. 

In 1912 an unsinkable ship left on a journey across the North Atlantic. A few years earlier Captain Smith’s own words were that “When anyone asks me how I can best describe my experiences of nearly forty years at sea, I merely say uneventful. I have never been in an accident of any sort worth speaking about....I never saw a wreck and have never been wrecked, nor was I ever in any predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort.” Everyone’s opinion was correct, in that the Titanic could not sink, since the experts who designed it said so, and they were in the good hands of Captain Smith. As we all know, the Titanic went down, but not because someone failed to complete a task, but because the system worked the way it was designed to work. NOTE: The system didn’t work as expected, but as designed. The team who designed the ship and operational process were in agreement and could therefore not be wrong. A safety statement in advertising is to persuade their team that a million people cannot be wrong. Any person who does not accept this statement is shunned or rejected by the group. A team was in the pre-SMS days a group of experts where the person with the best vocabulary or authority made an opinion-based decision and called it a team decision. 

Behind every door is a virtual reality attendee with facts to be discovered.
Over time virtual reality meetings or conferences has become the acceptable platform for meeting. Just a few months ago virtual meetings were infrequent and used as a last resort but changed very quickly. From small organizations to international level conferences, meetings are today conducted via virtual attendance. The aviation industry also adapted quickly to this platform where attendees are now placed in separate rooms or even separate locations across the globe. The transition from old-fashion meetings to virtual attendance just happened without conducting a safety case or change management analysis. Just as the Titanic was unsinkable, transitioning to virtual attendance was to be a flawless transition. 

An analysis of a transition to virtual attendance shows that teamwork has become much more team platform oriented and reduced the “I” from the team. Attendees now has an opportunity to raise their concerns, opinions, or suggestions by their physical distance from the other team members. There is also an opportunity for everyone to make their voice heard by anonymous submissions. Virtual attendance has opened a new door to the Safety Management System where facts are forced to be analyzed, rather than someone needs to “take one for the team”.  In a virtual conference environment, the other option but to accept inputs from everyone on the team, is to end the meeting. This unexpected change of personal involvement is a positive change to the aviation industry and hazard identification. 

An opportunity is delivered on a blank sheet of paper.
An enterprise operating within an SMS-world is required to implement a non-punitive policy, or a policy that differences of options cannot be punished. Since the beginning of SMS, in 2006 when Canada as the first country implemented the SMS regulations, a non-punitive policy was expected to be applied to airline or airport operations for hazard or incident reporting. This policy often came with a caveat that it would not be applied to illegal activity, negligence, or wilful misconduct. The intent, or expectation of the non-punitive policy was to protect a person when involved or observed unexpected events of job performance. A non-punitive policy is integrated in the safety policy on which the SMS system is based. The non-punitive policy was not considered to applied to meetings or teamwork, since it was a flight crewmember or airside worker who would fail their tasks and not the management who designed the systems. 

In a regulatory world the Safety Management System is applicable to an air operator certificate and an airport certificate. Any person who is without a role or responsibility in operations or management of these certificates may be excluded from the non-punitive policy. E.g., someone maintaining offices may be excluded, while someone maintaining an aircraft, or the airfield must be included. The Accountable Executive, CEO, or President are included, any management levels are included, and any operational and support levels are included in the non-punitive policy. However, senior management were excluded from the caveat that a non-punitive policy should be applied for illegal activity, negligence, or wilful misconduct. 

The “I” in team still exists within an SMS system and cannot be removed or ignored. The “I” in team is the SMS policy, the SMS non-punitive policy, objectives, goals, and parameters. Virtual reality attendance meetings have improved the opportunity for attendees to assign data, information, knowledge and their comprehension of systems to policies and objectives and bypass the gatekeeper’s opinion. Virtual attendance has placed the “I” in team where it should be, which is in the Safety Policy Team. When the Safety Policy is the focus of the discussion, teamwork is simplified.      
   

Catalina9






Sunday, April 18, 2021

Diversity in Aviation

 Diversity in Aviation 

By Catalina9

Now and then, there are newspaper articles and news stories about diversity in  aviation and discussions if diversity would improve safety or not. Some of the  arguments against diversity is that the captain of the aircraft should be the best and diversity should not be considered. At the other end, the argument for  diversity is that a diverse team stay stronger against bullies, or the one with the  best vocabulary who wins the deal. The news media portrays these opinions as  opposite ends of a spectrum from safe to unsafe. Sometimes discussions are in  favor of diversity, while other times diversity is unsafe. No matter who wants to  be the safest candidate, both sides are using the safety card. The only reason to  play the safety card is that there is no data to support their statements. Everyone  falls for the safety card and becomes paralyzed in a discussion against safety. The  answer to diversity is not if it is safe or not, but to answer the question of what personal qualities a successful pilot has. The only different between a pilot and  other jobs, is that everyone else do not fall to the ground when taking the wrong  turn at the fork in the road. Learning pilot skills are no special or difficult skills to  learn that only certain pre-selected people can learn. It is a skill anyone can learn  by determination and focus. Diversity in aviation is to recognize people who are  excellent at managing these human behavior skills. 

Becoming a successful pilot requires a combination of skills. It is not all  mathematical and technical, but they have to think creatively, act under pressure,  and adopt a mentality fitting for a role of such great responsibility. Pilots not only  require leadership qualities, but they also have to communicate and work well as  part of a team. The aviation industry in general expects that a plot develops  several human behaviors skills to be a successful pilot. These principles are true  for single-pilot operations or as a member of a multi-crew operations. They are  true for recreational, or general aviation an professional or commercial aviation. A  successful pilot communicates with clear communication, not only verbally, but  also behavioral communication. Clear communication closes the gap between  expectations, assumptions and anticipation and those immediate tasks to take  place in the immediate future. Clear communication also closes the gap between these short-term actions and long-term objections, which is to move the aircraft  from one location to another without disruptions, unplanned, or unexpected  events.  

Pilots has developed a successful skill of situational awareness. Generally,  situational awareness in aviation is that pilots know where they are and know  where they are going. However, this definition assumes that the pilots is working  within a flawless operational environment and that they are the only system that  potentially will malfunction. Situational awareness is comprehension awareness,  where data collected is turned into information, knowledge and system  comprehension or interactions. Situational awareness is therefore more than just  


The pilot of an aircraft maintained situational awareness of the Cali fix, but crashed into the high mountains

knowing where you are at point in space over the surface of the earth. Situational  awareness is to understand where in the process the automated system is, it is to  understand what is coming next in the process, it is to understand the effect of  flight control inputs, including long-term effect, it is to understand power plants,  it is to understand human factors, it is to understand the environment, it is to  understand topography, it is to understand law of physics, it is to understand  aircraft systems, it is to understand navigation aid inputs, it is to understand  display outputs, including visual navigation, it is to understand positions as to  point in space, it is to understand air traffic controller communication and intent,  it is to understand outside visual clues, it is to understand airport environment  and it is to overlay all these situational awareness clues in correct order onto  visual cockpit displays and instrument communication, with a mental picture of  what effect it will have on continuing the flight. In addition, when in visual  meteorological conditions, or on a visual approach, situational awareness is to  transfer this virtual information onto the visual view ahead. 

Successful pilots have developed teamworking skills. A successful airline several  years ago was operating with a principle that captains who had not developed  teamworking skills, were forced into a crew environment with major frictions.  Eventually, this crew-pairing caused a fatal crash, but the airline also made its  point. Accidents will happen if the crew opposes teamwork. Teamworking skills is  to develop forward-looking accountability, or to recognize and accept that current  actions, or reactions, have consequences. Conventional wisdom is that there is no  “I” in team, but there is. Within a team the Captain still has and must have the  final decision authority. Teamwork is not to accept the lowest common  denominator, but to input data into the Captain’s decision-making process.  

There is an “I” in TEAM.

A successful pilot has developed decisiveness and resilience. Time and resource constraints,as well as other pressure-adding  factors are decision making challenges for pilots. Pilot’s resilience to unexpected situations, or special  cause variations, are fully developed by self-experienced events. Resilience is  continuous improvements, or incremental improvements of a pilot’s behavior  during unexpected events, obstacle assessments or emergencies. A pilot is  expected to make sound judgements for the best possible outcome for their  circumstance. 

A successful pilot remains calm. Remaining calm is different than taking your time  to assess or react to events. It is to react immediately based on the unexpected  event. Depending on the emergency, there will always be a point of no return,  where any sound decision, or reaction does not change the outcome. Remaining  calm is also a skill developed over time and matured to a point where a reaction  to an emergency becomes a normal part of the operations. Several years ago, a  flight crew experienced a fire in the airplane just after takeoff. The captain  initiated the emergency action by returning for landing, knowing that the aircraft  needed be on the ground within 8-minutes before the point of no return was  reached. The first officer panicked and froze on the controls at which time the  captain had to momentarily interrupt the person’s behavior, taking time away  from the emergency. Calmness, as a skill developed incrementally and by self experience is a quality of a successful pilot.  
Self discipline and time management are two other traits of a successful pilot. Discipline is to do what you know you needs to be done to become very best in  your field as a successful pilot. Perhaps the best definition of self discipline is the  ability to make yourself do what you should do when you should do it, whether  you feel like it or not. It is easy to do something when you feel like it. It’s when  you don’t feel like it and you force yourself to do it anyway that you move your  life and career onto the fast track. A successful pilot has become successful in self  discipline and time management.
  
Leadership motivation is another skill needed for a successful pilot. There are five  general leadership style that a pilot should comprehend. The first leadership style  is Structural. Everyone knows exactly what needs to be done, why it needs to be  done, and to what standard. The next leadership style is Participative. This style  makes your team feel that you really care about them by putting them first and  they are treated with the same respect, patience, and understanding. The third  leadership style is Servant, which is a great style to start off with to gain respect,  trust, and loyalty. The style also builds a strong culture since it tailors to the  team’s needs. The next leadership style is Freedom, where people have an  opportunity to perform. This style inspires an entrepreneurial spirit with a clear  goal in your team members. The fifth leadership style is Transformational, which  is a leadership style that affect people’s emotions by painting a big, exciting  picture of the future. People are transformed by tapping into their hopes, dreams,  and ideals. Personnel becomes motivated, leaders become motivated, and  productivity is enhanced through high transparency and communication. 

A successful pilot has the ability to understand technical information and they  need to comprehend how their aircraft works. They comprehend how decisions affects aircraft performance, regulatory compliance and compliance with their  company’s safety policy. A successful pilot’s technical expertise is limited to  control inputs and comprehension of how this affects aircraft performance. The  extent they are expected to repair a malfunction is limited to the checklist items.  The times when a pilot also was a certified aircraft mechanic has passed. By  understanding technical information, a successful pilot has a tool to communicate errors effectively. 

Flying is more than recalling infinity of numbers.
A successful pilot is more than  
a numbers person. Pilots need 
to know the numbers for the  
aircraft, with the capability to  
perform mental arithmetic  
calculations quickly on  
demand. These calculations are  
automated and performed by  
computers. However, as an  
auditor of these systems a pilot  
needs to comprehend what,  when, where, why, who and  how of these calculations. A tragic example is how an airliner crashed in the South  Atlantic several years ago since the pilot could not comprehend these auto calculations.  

It is also said that a successful pilot must know when it is acceptable to break the  rules. Pilots have strict set of rules to follow, laid out by regulating bodies and  various other authoritative sources. Rules are often implemented from public  pressure as a response to prevent known causes of accidents. Regulatory fuel reserve became a regulatory requirement since fuel-burn calculations were  unreliable in the past, pilots were pressured to accept ATC approach delay  clearances, or incorrect weight calculation or winds aloft changed the fuel-burn.  

Many great inventions and safety improvements came about after major aviation  accidents, but with all the rules implemented, they still did not prevent accidents.  As to the conventional wisdom that a pilot must know when it is acceptable to  break the rule is false and incorrect. The Captain is the final authority of an  aircraft and responsible for the safety of that flight. As the final authority the  Captain must comply with a rule taking precedence over all other rules, which is  the safety of that flight. Whatever a Captain does to ensure safety of that flight  does therefore not break any rule at all.  

There are many examples in aviation history of a perfect pilot being involved in an  aviation accident. The perfect pilot was involved in the fist accident on September  17, 1908, injuring Captain Orville Wright. Two perfect pilots were operating two  airplanes that crashed over Grand Canyon in 1956. An exemplary pilot and a  model for all other pilots was in 1977 involved in the worst aviation accident to  date. In 1978 a perfect pilot crashed when a thrust-reverser deployed during a  missed approach. In 2017 the perfect pilot lined up their approach on a taxiway  with sequenced airplanes. The list could go on an on how perfect pilots were  involved in accidents. 
 
When diversity is being discussed, the discussion evolves about safety, ensuring  that the best pilot is flying the airplane or that there is only one type of pilot that  is safety. Often that type is a pilot who fits all the checkbox answers. What is  forgotten in this equation is that the past does not guarantee the future.  

Diversity in aviation is about the Enterprise itself, the Accountable Executive, and  their Project Solutions Leadership Motivation. When diversity is discussed on the  public platform, these discussions take an emotional turn where diversity is no  longer based on facts but on the comfort level of the participants. The public  opinion, which is a trigger for new regulations, is swayed by the participant with  the best vocabulary as opposed to the facts providing directions at the fork in the  road. The best example of this is that a Regulatory changed their aviation Safety  Management System due to emotional pressure from inspectors and the public. 

Diversity in aviation is about exposure to events and the environment. Exposure is  more than training, since it is about personal experience, it is about the emotions  when unexpected events occur, and it is about a Captain making the right  decisions when everything else goes wrong and when all odds are against you. It  was exposure that saved a light twin in the Rockies running into severe icing, losing all instruments, and ended up in a spin. It was exposure that saved the  MU2 with dual flameout in the Rockies. It was exposure that saved the Hudson River aircraft and it was exposure that saved the Gimli Glider from a major  accident.  

Catalina9





Tuesday, April 6, 2021

Predictive SMS

 Predictive SMS

By Catalina9

There are three level of a Safety Management System (SMS). Level 1 is the reactive level, Level 2 is the proactive level, and Level 3 is the predictive level. A fully developed SMS is an SMS at a level when predictions are applied. A predictive level is different than a proactive level, but these two levels also work in harmony. Level 1, as a reactive level stands out in its own class since no actions are required until after the fact, or after the data is available in a data collection tool. Level 2 is reactive to ensure that certain events do not occur again. Level 3, the predictive level, is when the system delivers predictions of future events.  


A predictive level is the guide to excellence 
 A predictive level is different than to foresee the future.   A predictive SMS is about comparing data collected   and results from the past with current data collected to   predict the future. Without making any changes to   human factors system, organizational factors system,   supervision system, or environmental system the   outcome from the past will repeat itself in the future. A   predictive system is not designed, or capable of   predicting a specific event in time (duration), space   (location) and compass (direction), but can predict an   outcome when certain parameters are met. If a person   is  not trained to tow airplanes but expected to park five   airplanes in a hangar that normally holds only four, there is a high probability that at least one airplane will be damaged during one of the towing process. This is predictable, but it is impossible to predict a date and time of the future incident. 

A predictive SMS is also quite different from a proactive process. A reactive SMS is to generated corrective actions and implemented to respond to event analysis and to avoid future incidents or accidents. A predictive SMS is opposite to a reactive system in that a predictive level accepts that future incidents or accidents are inevitable. In a reactive system hazards are captured and entered into a hazard register for analysis. After the proactive and hazard register process is completed, the predictive system goes into the hazard register to predict what hazards are next in line to cause an incident or accident. In short, the proactive system placed hazards in the hazard register into boxes so they could no longer cause incidents, or unscheduled events, while the predictive system then removed some hazards and placed them into another box of future known incidents. It is only when an enterprise accepts that incidents are inevitable that incremental safety improvements becomes available as a safety tool.

At fist glance it also appears that the proactive and predictive system opposes each other, since the proactive system is generating corrective actions to ensure that certain incidents do not happen again, while the predictive system makes these same hazards a cause for the next incident. Yes, they are two different systems, but they complement each other. 

Remember, a predictive system is not a system with the ability to pinpoint the next incident. After a hazard register is populated and corrective actions plans (CAP) are assigned, a predictive system takes over and monitor the CAP processes. A predictive system is a daily quality control system. Some predictions may be long term, while other predictions are only available short term. If an aircraft is still travelling at 100 KTS when reaching the threshold markings at the other end, a confident prediction is that within the next few seconds the aircraft runs of the runway. If this same airplane is touching down beyond the half-way point of the runway, a runway excursion may be predicted, but it is a prediction with less confidence. At the third event, the aircraft is on approach speed and slope for a touchdown point within the touchdown area. A prediction can be made that this will be a successful landing. All this make sense, but why even bother making such obvious short-term predictions. It is absolutely true that it is nonsense to make these short-term predictions since they do not include processes to affect the outcome. A predictive SMS predicts long term predictions with a high level of confidence of an outcome by monitoring hazards. 

A predictive level is the foundation of a sound marketing plan for SMS.
From a reactive system point of view each hazard are placed in a box labeled “Corrected Hazards”. What the predictive system does is to pick up one hazard at a time and monitor it. Hazards are monitored daily within a quality control system and analyzed to the level of job performance, or how the job is done. A job performance level is analyzed to four high level factors: Human Factors (HF), Organizational Factors (OF), Supervision Factors (SF) and Environmental Factors (EF). Applying a daily rundown of airport operations tasks, these factors are monitored and recorded. Over time a predictive SMS will paint a picture of each task and if the picture mirrors expectations from the hazard register incidents are bypassed. 

In a predictive SMS the four factors are in a mastermind alliance where they are working actively together in perfect harmony toward a common definite objective. This is similar to the S-H-E-L-L model where Software, Hardware, Environment, Liveware (people) and Liveware interact with each other in a robust way. Human Factors, Organizational Factors, Supervision Factors and Environmental Factors in a predictive SMS interact with each other in incremental improvements. A change to one of the factors requires a change to one or more of the other factors. Example: An organization may change their organizational factors to suit a Safety Management System, or a person may learn to recite the alphabet for the first time, but without making changes to supervision factors there are opposing 
internal forces acting for and against incremental improvements. A person may learn to recite the alphabet for the first time, but without harmony between HR, OF, SF and EF the opposing forces are destructive to learning. 

A predictive SMS detects these opposing internal forces and can with a high level of certainty, or probability, predict that by continuing down the same path without harmony, eventually the bubble will burst, or an incident will happen. When a paired flight crew, captain and first officer, are opposing each other that aircraft is on its way towards an accident. A predictive SMS recognizes and display these forces.  


Catalina9


Monday, March 22, 2021

Where Is SMS Going

 Where Is SMS Going

By Catalina9

The Safety Management System (SMS) in aviation is has since its infancy taken many twists and turns to find a path forward. SMS started out as an idea of how aviation should manage safety and for the system to be integrated into a functional safety system in the operations. Prior to SMS safety was managed by the “safety card”, or an opinion-based safety solution process. With this in mind, the onset of SMS forced airlines and airport operators to revamp their safety structure and change their approach to safety 180 degrees. 

Without taking ownership of SMS direction for success is only random
This new approach caused conflicts and confusion and the path of least resistance was to reject the new Safety Management System. Rejection became apparent in news articles about how SMS had failed safety and surveys were tailored to show this. However, over a short time SMS grew enough roots to resist being pulled out and it grew stronger. One lesson the aviation industry learned quickly about SMS was that it could not fail since it was a mirror of their operations and painted a true picture of their leadership. As a mirror, the SMS caused a friction between SMS and its Accountable Executive. Since the aviation industry had developed a great safety record over the years, it was difficult to accept the fact that they might not be as safe as they thought they were.

SMS will be going in the direction of what direction the aviation industry wants it to take. It is therefore crucial that high-level leaders understand and comprehend their SMS and policies they are drafting. SMS is unlike older safety systems in that it does not force safety onto operators, but rather identifies to operators if they drift away from or remains on the path towards their objectives and goals. SMS is designed to be a fluid system and adjust to operational needs. Regulatory oversight bodies and the aviation industry are both affected by external pressure from the public, from the industry itself and from political polices of how to regulatory shape the SMS. Just a short time after SMS became a regulatory requirement for all operators, the smaller on-demand and charter only operators were excluded from operating with an SMS. This was the first time the aviation industry mapped the SMS landscape and chose their path of least resistance.

The path to a successful SMS is a balancing act.
 There are two different paths the SMS needs to take   going forward. One is the regulatory path and the   other is the operational path. These are two distinct   and different paths, while they still are connected to   the outcome of safety. Look at this as each rail of a   railroad track. Regulations in themselves are not   safety in operations requirements, but requirements   for compliance in a static environment. This can best   be described as the issuance of an airline or airport   certificate, which is issued to a static environment with planned directions of travel. As soon as there are movements is when it becomes operational and incremental safety improvements kicks in. The regulator must assess an SMS based on regulatory compliance, while an operator must assess their SMS in a fluid and operational state. Only by comprehending SMS is it possible to see the differences and that these two paths are parallel and not opposing paths.

The path SMS needs to take is the system approach path where the task becomes to design systems and processes to complete operational tasks without first assessing each task for regulatory compliance. This does not imply that systems are not assessed for regulatory compliance, but rather that the first task is to identify current operational processes since they paint a true picture of operations. This is different than conducting a gap analysis, since it is a process tracking task. After systems and processes are identified, they are assigned a regulatory compliance component and integrated in a daily quality control system. Quality control of operations is a prerequisite for the Quality Assurance System. 
Without a quality control path, the SMS is wavering

Where SMS is going is difficult to predict since there are special cause variations that will affect its path. The path it must take is the path of incremental safety improvements for both airlines and airports. Over time it will be possible to identify drift away the desired and projected path. When drift is identified it becomes possible to make incremental corrections of operational processes to change course or move back onto the path. Drift in itself is not necessarily undesirable or an unsafe change, but often a change because the planned systems and processes were impractical. The unsafe portion of drift is when the drift itself remains unidentified. 

The first stage of drift at the operational level is for a process to self-adjusts to a practical process; e.g. a pilot changing from IFR to a visual approach in VFR conditions. Eventually this drift was identified and integrated as a standard process. The second part of drift is at the management or organizational level where complacency drives the processes. Social media also has a major impact on the SMS decision-making process.  Social media is free advertising for special interest groups, including support groups for a healthy Safety Management System. 

When assessing the future of where SMS Is Going one must reflect on the past path. It is reasonable to assess that the past path of SMS, becomes a forward-looking guidance of the path to come in the future. By laying out the path from the past drift can be monitored and adjusted if the drift is undesirable. SMS is a system which cannot fail since it paints a true picture of an enterprise. For several reasons there were opposition to SMS from the industry and the regulator when the SMS regulations first was implemented. Some of the opposition was reasonable and relevant to the facts, while other were emotional and irrelevant to facts. Within a short time, surveys were designed to fail the SMS. An example is the CBC News article posted on April 14, 2014 about SMS; “A survey of Canada’s aviation inspectors shows they are increasingly concerned about aviation safety because of Transport Canada rules that leave responsibility for setting acceptable levels of risk up to the airlines. The survey, conducted by Abacus Data on behalf of the Canadian Federal Pilots Association (CFPA), indicates 67 per cent of Canadian aviation inspectors believe the current system increases the risk of a major aviation accident, up from 61 per cent in 2007.” Today is 2021, and we now know that 67% were wrong at that time. There has not been a major aviation accident being contributed to the SMS since the survey. Human factors has not changed and it is reasonable to assume that when opinions about SMS is applied, as opposed to data and facts, 67% will be wrong in the future. 

There was one simple reason why SMS was made a regulatory requirement some years ago. The reason was an understanding that their old aviation oversight system was not capable of preventing accidents. It was also understood that operators, both airlines and airports, did not have a regulatory tool available to prevent accidents until SMS became available.  A friend of mine once said: “As long as the regulatory authorities don't receive feedback from operators (as it is now in many countries), and safety accountability is not practiced and not even understood or taken seriously, the SMS will still generate data, but I cannot imagine or would say if it would be worth data; i.e. proactive data.“ This is so true. Data will be pouring in and stored without assessment or considerations. The test today to lay out the path for the NexGen SMS, is to apply the WINK test, or the What I Now Know test. If I had known then, what I now know, what would I have done different about SMS and then apply this comprehension to the NextGen SMS path. 

Comprehending SMS is a process.

Foundation of comprehension is data. When raw data is collected it comes in all types, shapes, and forms. Some enterprises do not accept data, or reports, if they are not submitted in its proper format. When the report-format is the primary tool to validate a report, the report itself will be a support tool for the safety policy rather than a support tool for data collection of hazards. An enterprise should accept any reports submitted in any format, by a report form, email, telephone, fax, verbally, news article, regulatory finding or even as a hearsay. Look at the reports as the ballots for a small-town mayor election, where the candidates are randomly submitted without preference until the count is completed. It is when data is analyzed it can be turned into information. Information is neutral, without bias or emotions. Information generate knowledge by being absorbed by one or more of the five senses. Absorbed knowledge then generates comprehension of one or more systems and their interactions.

A Safety Management System is irrelevant to safety unless it operates with a daily rundown quality controls system and daily incremental improvements derived from WINK or the What I Now Know test. For the Safety Management System to be effective, all levels in an organization must be able to answer the same question asked over and over again; “Why does the Global Aviation Industry, being Airlines or Airports, need a Safety Management System (SMS) today, when they were safe yesterday without an SMS?” Unless the reason is known, there is no motivation to improve. For the next ten years, the one major definite purpose and the greatest single reason for an SMS is for every single airline or airport personnel to accept and take ownership of their Safety Management System. There is nothing else that matters on the path Where SMS Is Going.  

Catalina9


Sunday, March 7, 2021

Complacency

 Complacency

By Catalina9

Complacency is a human behavior hazardous to aviation safety. Complacency has become the new root cause for accidents and replaced pilot error. It is conventional wisdom that complacency is caused by the very things that should prevent accidents, factors like experience, training and knowledge contribute to complacency. Complacency makes crews skip hurriedly through checklists, fail to monitor instruments closely or utilize all navigational aids. It can cause a crew to use shortcuts and poor judgement and to resort to other malpractices that mean the difference between hazardous performance and professional performance. Complacency is also given as the reason when things go wrong flying the same route daily or doing the same job regularly. Complacency has just become another word for pilot error. However, this is all wrong. Complacency is not caused by experience, training, or knowledge. Complacency is all about organizational factor. 

Complacency is to take the path of least resistance.
 When conducting a root cause analysis within a   Safety Management System (SMS) world there are   four factors to consider. These are human factors,   organizational factors, supervision factors and   environmental factors. It is also crucial to a root   cause analysis to know that these factors do not   cause  complacency. In a healthy enterprise   complacency as a root cause does not exist. 



Complacency is when you are no longer striving to do your best or perform with accountability, but just do the minimum to get by. Complacency is also when you are not staying up to date in your field as an airline or airport operator. Complacency is to wait for the regulator to find problems with operations, rather than operating with a Quality Assurance System. Even if the subject is not linked to the aviation industry, take a course, or attend a conference. It is easy to drift into complacency, but it is not noticeable yourself.  Complacency is also when you are not seeking or taking advantage of new opportunities but relying on yesterdays news. There are enterprises, both large and small, that believe training is busy-time, or waste of time since their personnel was already trained. Annual training that is not a regulatory requirement are discouraged by these so-called leaders.  When you do not seek or take advantage of opportunities your skills become stale. Doing the same thing over and over gets boring. You remain invisible. Key stakeholders and decision makers do not know that the value that you contribute is to set up for an accident. Look for opportunities to work on new projects and maintain an active and curious mind. Complacency is when you are not maintaining or building your network of business contacts or associating with the industry.  When you do not build ongoing relationships at work or stay tuned to aviation news, you are not privy to critical information that can influence your daily job performance. Complacency is when you do not risk sharing your opinion or ideas. This is a high-risk factor, since when there is an inherent risk by sharing opinions, enterprises are operating outside a just culture environment. 

Complacency is to force the wrong piece to fit the puzzle.
 Complacency is not a condition but a symptom of   hazards within an enterprise and their lack of   commitment to organizational factors. To perform at 
 their best, individuals have two basic needs in the   world of work, if it is in the aviation industry or any   other industry.  The first is the autonomy need. This   is  the need to be seen and respected as an individual,   and to stand out for one’s personal performance. It is   a need to be recognized for individual achievements.   The second need is the dependency need that each   person has in the workplace. This is the need that people have to feel a part of something bigger than themselves. People want to be part of a team. It is the need to feel recognized and accepted as part of a group of people in the workplace.

Leaders create environments where people feel both autonomous and important, on the one hand, and have their dependency needs satisfied by making them feel as if they are part of a team; part of the whole organization. Using positive reinforcement at work is a key factor in personnel motivation. It is what takes place at the moment of contact or communication between the manager and personnel that is the key determinant of performance, effectiveness, productivity, output and profitability of an organization. The point at which the two people connect, whether positively or negatively, is where the past, present and future performance of the individual and the organization is determined. When this contact between the boss and the subordinate is positive, supportive, and encouraging of self-esteem and a positive self-image, then performance, productivity and output of the individual will reach its highest level.

When lightning strikes it’s best to play it safe.

  The worst way to gain personnel satisfaction is   when  the point of contact between the manager and   the managed is negative for any reason at all,   performance and output will decline. A negative   relationship with the boss will trigger fears of failure,   rejection, and disapproval. When their boss is   negative for any reason, people will play it safe, and   only do exactly what they need to do to avoid being 
 fired. Almost everyone has worked in a low self-   esteem environment. These are usually remembered   as the worst jobs the person ever had. Everything you do to improve this intersection or contact improves the overall quality of your work life, no matter where you are on the ladder of management.

The more effective you can become in eliciting peak performance from each of your staff members, the more and better people you will be given to manage for it. The top managers and leaders of today are those who are capable of eliciting extraordinary performance from ordinary people. Effective managers are intensely action oriented. When they hear a good idea, they move quickly to implement the idea and put it into action. Therefore, if you hear about anything that you think can help you to motivate your staff to a higher level, do not delay. Practice it immediately, that very day. You will be amazed at the results.

The Safety Management System (SMS) has all the tools an enterprise needs for Project Solutions Leadership Motivation. SMS has a just culture, where there is trust, learning, accountability and information sharing. In a successful SMS world, comprehension is derived from data (collected by hazard, incident or accident reports), information (data is turned into information), knowledge (absorbed information) and comprehension (interacting systems). When comprehension is missing the system is faulty, or data is not analyzed, system comprehension is faulty. This faulty system comprehension does not rest with pilots, mechanics, or airport crew, but with the enterprise. When a CEO or Accountable Executive wants to find out the reason for complacency in their organization, all they have to do is to take a look in the mirror. 

Catalina9





Tuesday, February 23, 2021

When Hazards Are Reactive

 When Hazards Are Reactive

By Catalina9

It is a regulatory requirement that an airport or airline has a process in place for identifying hazards to aviation safety. It is also expected that an airport or airline has a proactive process or system that provides for the capture of information identified as hazards. At the time when the Safety Management System (SMS) was implemented, both airlines and airports established a reactive process to capture operational hazards as they were relaying on organizational personnel to identify and report hazards. This process in itself is a hazard, but was put in place without a risk assessment or change management analysis. The directive was simply for their personnel to head out to identify and report hazards.

Some activity is a hazard simply due to regulatory non-compliance



Within the SMS regulations, hazards are defined as a proactive process. A proactive process is to recognize an opportunity and plan a change. It is also to test the change by carrying out a small-scale study or apply your SMS random sampling process. After testing is completed, the task is to review the test, analyze the results, and identify what you have learned. The next critical step, which is a step often assumed as an unwritten rule, is to make a decision. A decision is more than decide on what path to take, it is to identify and document hazards and make a risk analysis decision. A final .step of the decision circle is to take action based on what you learned in the study step. If the change did not work, go through the cycle again with a different plan. If you were successful, incorporate what you learned from the test into wider changes. Use what you learned to plan new improvements, beginning the cycle again.

At the time of SMS implementation and when airports and airlines made their decision for operational personnel to identify and report hazards, they had overlooked the decision step. Since the step was overlooked, or ignored, they unknowingly placed their personnel in a hazardous environment. It was understandable to all that no consideration to this issue was made at that time since there were no changes to their current operational processes. Pilots were still flying airplanes the same way, ground personnel did their regular jobs, mechanics kept on fixing airplanes and airport personnel continued with their same tasks as they had done for years. In their own mind there were no change management analysis required. However, if their analysis had included a decision process, a door would have opened to the fact that SMS regulations were a new and require a change management analysis, or a safety case. Organizations, small and large, are still sending their personnel out in the minefield of hazard identification. 

At first glance it may not seem like a high risk to send personnel out looking for hazards, since they had worked in that same hazard environment prior to SMS implementation. To an extent this is true, except that SMS was a new regulation and required to come with a proactive hazard approach and personnel assigned duties are required to be trained. In addition, that all personnel were aware of the hazard environment they worked in was an assumption causing an assumed and untrue risk level. When airlines or airports are sending personnel out looking for hazards without guidance, they are accepting a risk beyond their own imagination. 

Identifying hazards is a process and like any other process which includes training and that there is a documented process to identify training requirements so that personnel are competent to perform their duties. An Accountable Executive is responsible for operations and accountable for meeting the regulatory requirements. It only takes a label, or organizational position to be accepted as an accountable executive, without any knowledge of SMS processes. The accountable executives for both airports and airlines have a responsibility to identify hazards prior to assigning personnel in their operations to identify these hazards. 

The task is to conduct a pre-hazard assessment and define the hazard as Safety Critical Areas (SCA) and Safety Critical Functions (SCF). The Safety Critical Function is a sub-category of the Safety Critical Area. It is assumed that any accountable executive has the knowledge and comprehension of their operations to develop their SCA and SCF. When a comprehensive list of SCA and SFC are developed, and personnel trained, they are qualified to go looking for hazards and report how they affect their operational tasks. An airport may assign their SCA to runways, taxiways, aprons, approaches, the runway strip etc, and assign SCF, or hazards that are common within those areas. The same concept goes for airlines, to establish SCA of ground operations, cockpit, cabin etc, and assign SCF to these areas.

Some years ago, I climbed a
tree to take a picture.
There was an inherent
risk by climbing
while the true risk
was waiting below.
   
    One question I am often asked is if a pilot or airport person, should         report the same hazard day after day and the answer is no, they             don’t. Hazards which are present daily and regularly are inherent         risks of aviation, or common cause variations and are mitigated             progressively. In addition, knowledge of these risks are learned by         obtaining a pilot license, crew training, company flight training,             airport manger certificate or other operational training. Knowing             what not to report is just as much a part of organizational hazard             training as knowing what to report. This type of training is also             commonly called Judgement Training.

    Operators without a Judgement Training program are operating with     a reactive hazard reporting system. A couple of examples would be        an aircraft leaving the gate may have to navigate different routes            from time to time due to vehicle traffic or oncoming aircraft. These       are hazards, but not expected to be reported. 

    However, if a vehicle moves in an uncomfortable proximity to the       aircraft it becomes a reportable hazard. For airport operations, snow   on  the runway, while still reported as runway surface conditions, is   also a common, or inherent risk in aviation and not to be reported as a   hazard. On the other hand, if the snow is at a rate and quantity require   the airport to close, it becomes a reportable hazard. 


Catalina9






Monday, February 8, 2021

How To Implement Aviation SMS

 How To Implement Aviation SMS

By Catalina9

There are several tools available to an enterprise to build an aviation Safety Management System (SMS) program for an airline or airport and every operator wants the best possible tool for their operations. There are several pre-built SMS online software tools available and suppliers who generally offer the same service for an enterprise to conform to their operating system. This turn-key SMS program is an efficient way to establish a regulatory compliant SMS. Both airline and airport operators are then trained by their supplier in operations of the system and what fields to complete to achieve their desired result or outcome. Using this approach an enterprise will have their SMS up and running in no time.

After SMS is operational is when hard work begins
 After their SMS system is operational is when the   hard work begins. The SMS Manager’s tasks are to   identify hazards and carry out risk management   analyses of those hazards, investigate, analyze, and   identify the cause or probable cause of all hazards,   incidents, and accidents, monitor and evaluate the   results of corrective actions and determine the   adequacy of operational and SMS training. The SMS   Manager’s main role is the role and responsibility as   the data analytics expert and managing the process of   examining data sets to find trends and draw   conclusions about the information they contain. The SMS Software program must also include tasks for compliance with the SMS Manger responsibility to monitor the concerns of the civil aviation industry in respect of safety. 

A Quality Assurance Program is also an integrated component of the Safety Management System, and it’s impossible to run one without the other. There is an ongoing discussion if it is the SMS or the QA that should be built first when building the SMS. The same question is raised to the SMS software suppliers of what approach to expect from them when they are explaining their program. After conducting several interviews with software suppliers, my observations were that most of them are task oriented by providing training in program capability, or what checkbox to click, or where communication flows, or how to sort reports, rather than provide training in how their system helps an enterprise to maintain a Quality Assurance Program (QAP).

SMS success is available with a paperless system site document
Canada was the first country to implement SMS, and their program is built on six foundations, principles, or components. These components are the Safety Management Plan, Document Management, Safety Oversight, Training, Quality Assurance and Emergency Preparedness. Each one of the components are attached to a regulatory requirement under the Canadian Aviation Regulations. Within the SMS itself is a QA component which allows for the QA to be operational if the SMS has been implemented. Without SMS the QA as a regulatory compliance component is unavailable. On the other hand, without the QA, SMS is a program without directional guidance. A dilemma when implementing the Safety Management System is to find out where to begin, or to find the first thread to pull, or where to place the first piece of a puzzle. 

Compare the processes of implementing an SMS to making bread. Making bread is a specialized process where each ingredient is to be measured, individually prepared, placed at a pre-determined place in the process, integrated with the other ingredients, or mixed, and baked at a pre-determined temperature and time. After the baking process is completed the process is to place the bread on a shelf for cooling and a quality control (QC) of the bread. Quality control is different than quality assurance but is also a prerequisite for a quality assurance program. The quality control process is not just to assess the value of the outcome but is also a quality control of each input ingredient. Before the grain is milled into flour, it goes through a quality control check, or before water is added to the equation it is also checked in a quality control process. Each one of these quality control checks should be under the umbrella of a Quality Assurance Program. 

Success is paperless site documents.
So, when we have all the ingredients to make bread, we are ready to go, right? Anyone should know how to make it, since everything that’s needed is there and available. When SMS was implemented in Canada all the ingredients were handed out, but without directions. This caused confusion, and it became easier to reject SMS than to learn about it. In addition, the path of least resistance was for operators to purchase an SMS software with tasks to click and assign. Airlines who drastically had failed a regulatory inspection would pass with flying colors with an SMS cloudbased program, but without having gained new SMS knowledge. 

The third principle, or component introduced when implementing the SMS is training, or directional control. Enterprises in Canada was given all ingredients for a successful SMS, but without directions of where to start or where to look first, they were unable to put the pieces together. Enterprises kept on failing inspections and SMS was blamed. 

When training someone to make a bread, the first step is to show the outcome, or what a bread should look like. There is a reason why products in advertising looks or behaves perfect and the same reason should be applied to bread making. A perfect product, or service, is emotionally desirable which makes it easier to recall as a positive and desired experience. After the bread is accepted as a positive outcome, the next steps are to communicate the purpose of each ingredient. The water needs to be warmed up to a temperature with very narrow tolerances or else it will destroy the live cells in the yeast. One ingredient out of place, or incorrect measured, affects the outcome of the bread. The same principles are applicable to a Safety Management System. 

The four items introduced as a possible place to start when implementing SMS are the SMS itself, QA, QC and Training. None of these stands out like a star as the perfect place to start and the fifth element of process tracing is therefore introduced. Process Tracing (PT) is where the outcome, or last step, becomes the beginning, while the first input of the process becomes the end or product outcome. At each stage, or change, in process tracing both a quality control element and a training element are introduced. When all five elements are included, an enterprise is ready to implement SMS. 

The first step when implementing SMS is training by process tracing from beginning to end. The second step is also training with process tracing to the first stage or change in process where quality control is applied and each step is traced until the end. The purpose of the QAP is to analyze the training, process tracing, how quality control performed at each step and where in the SMS regulatory requirement hierarchy these elements integrate with the Safety Management System processes. In short, implementing the SMS is a step-by-step process and applying elements as required for the process to continue. 

An effective SMS needs to be managed by an SMS cloudbased software. However, it is vital for a successful SMS that the SMS cloudbased program is implemented as a part of SMS implementation, as opposed to be implemented as a solution to recover from findings. A cloudbased safety program is a necessity to manage the Safety Management System. My experience is that there is only one exceptionally well designed, adaptable to every situation, being airline or airport, and user-friendly cloudbased program available. 


Catalina9





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