Flight Safety Begins At The Dinner Table

Flight Safety Begins At The Dinner Table

NOTE: This post is from one of our frequent contributors to this blog, "Birdseye59604."

Often risk assessments are conducted to mitigate obvious dramatic and dangerous situation

to aviation. But what effect do the every day trivial events have on flight safety? It's not only

disasters that could cause an incidents, but also positive and enjoyable events. A pleasant

conversation at the dinner table could distract and cause a human mind to drift away from

focusing on tasks. What takes place at the dinner table may be a contributing factor to the

outcome of next flight.

It's widely accepted in the aviation industry that disasters, catastrophic events and accidents

affects human behavior and decision making with a greater risk of an unplanned event. When

airplanes lift of the runway; passengers, staff and air traffic controllers have faith in the system

that no one had a dramatic experience affecting their job performance. However, the enjoyable

moments may also distract and make an impact human behavior.

A hazard might not be mitigable when the risk assessment is not analyzed at appropriate level.

Job performance is the quality of an end result of a task completed, based on defined

expectations. This result is documented, tracked, analyzed with an assessment of systems

involved in reaching an acceptable level. This quality of job performance begins with the dinner

table conversations.

Dinner conversations are both entertaining and educational, with subjects ranging from simple

conversations of discussing TV shows, to teenager issues or complex science fiction theories

that speed of darkness is infinite. There is no limits to what imagination may produce, and

these conversations may affect human behavior and eventually job performances.

When imagination is filled with endless opportunities of directions; then focus on the task assigned.

When an aircraft lifts off, being a small with one person on board, or mega-sized with over

300 passengers, the assumption is that the crew at the controls are focused to perform

beyond regulatory requirements to an acceptable safety level. If something does not goes

according to plans, the pilot is often the first one to be scrutinized. Dinner table conversations

may have an effect on job performances of other than pilot tasks, ranging from of aircraft

design, manufacturing, software programming, data entries and inputs, dispatch, or enterprise

operational control. Several manufacturing and technical systems have quality control

processes in place to discover errors before being applied and distributed into the process.

With the implementation of Safety Management System (SMS), operational control of flight

safety are achieved by applying a quality assurance program to capture errors before they are

applied in the process.

BirdsEye59604

SMS Makes Flying Safer

SMS Makes Flying Safer

NOTE: This post is from one of our frequent contributors to this blog, "Birdseye59604."

A Safety Management System (SMS) makes flying safer and is a positive addition to deliver quality service to the flying public. Airlines operating within an SMS system are far better off than someone without an operational control management system.  SMS in itself does not cause aviation accidents. However, as the case might be when accidents happen, it's often the new kid on the block who gets the blame.

It has been implied that aviation was safer prior to implementation of SMS, during the days of traditional inspections with spot-checks of operations, crews and aircrafts. Without going into the details, the facts are that aviation accidents also occurred prior to SMS.   

There is no secret to SMS. The outcome is determined by process inputs

The question is what type of oversight system is desired as a functional and superior system. Some opinions are that the old and traditional method is preferable, while other opinions are that the new SMS system is more effective.

A traditional system of oversight is similar to what is on the roads for heavy-trucks with scales and carrier enforcement. This is intended as a deterrent to violate the rules and with the assumption that if the rules are not violated, then the operation is safe. Similar in aviation, the assumption is that if rules and regulations are not violated the operation is safe and accidents will not happen.

In 1956 one of the worse accidents mid-air accidents happened over the Grand Canyon, with the result of creating more rules to prevent identical accidents. There was no indication of wrongdoing, or non-compliance with regulations by cancelling IFR and flying 1000-on top.

In traditional oversight the result may be checked, documented and paperwork compiled for a report to be issued. This report would not identify how the results were achieved, but just documented if paper-trail were in compliance or not. This type of a report is therefore nothing else but a report of results and not a reflection of operational safety, or of operational safety system control.

No matter how well written the process is, it is not effective if not understood

With this traditional method in place, it was the aviation operator who had final control over how they operate, run and manage their operation. These operational processes were not documented or assessed to level of regulatory compliance. The flying public may have assumed, but had no assurance of knowing if the airline had processes in place to address safety concerns or operational control to conform to regulatory compliance.

With SMS in place enterprises are accountable to operate with processes conforming to regulatory compliance, which often demands an operator to go above and beyond regulatory requirements, or in other words apply Best Practices.            

During the previous era of oversight, if hazards were not documented or identified, it was accepted that it had not happen, or that hazards didn't exist. Under the new system of SMS, if hazards are not documented, or identified this is lack of an operational system and non-conforming to regulatory requirements.

With both the old method of traditional inspections and with the new system of SMS oversight there is no difference in who makes decisions. Operator who previously made decisions still makes decisions of operating systems and processes. However, one key factor that is different, is to assess documented processes, and compare to interviews for evaluation of activeness and level of regulatory compliance. This key point of difference is what makes flying safer with SMS.

  

BirdsEye59604