Your Legend Is Our
Success
Post by Caltalina9
There
are multiple conflicting operational expectations between an airport Safety
Management System (SMS) and the airline SMS. For an airport certificate to
conform to regulatory requirement, the airport is required to accept less than
perfect aircraft operations. On the other hand, for an airline to conform to
regulatory compliance, they are required not to accept less than perfect
aircraft operations. The airport certificate is applied to operations of a
reality world, while the airline certificate is applied to a virtual world
operation.
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| Sucess is the foundation of safety improvements |
An
airport certificate is founded on flaws in the aircraft operations system,
while the airline certificate cannot operate with flaws. Airports are built for
accidents, while aircraft are built for perfectionism. An airline SMS which
does not accept incidents just eliminated their opportunity to improve in
safety. Aviation accidents needs to be accepted as an inherent risk of flying
and ongoing reality for the safe operation of an aircraft. This does not imply
that one single future accident is acceptable, but rather that a future
accident is an inevitable outcome.
The
risk management of an SMS includes a structured process for the assessment of
risk associated with identified hazards, expressed in terms of severity, level
of exposure and probability of occurrence. The level of exposure of an
occurrence equal one (1), since an occurrence is an event that already has
happened. Exposure to a hazard equals either zero (0) or one (1), depending on
if the hazard is known or unknown to the airport or airline operator.
If
hazard is known and expected to affect operations the exposure level equal one
(E.g. Obstacle on approach.)
If
hazard is unknown and expected to affect operations the exposure level equal
zero (E.g. Obstacle on approach)
That airports
and airlines accept the exposure of an unknown hazard that is expected to
affect operation, which makes a future accident is an inevitable outcome. The
SMS itself is not required to assess risk levels of unknown hazards. That an
organization has a proactive system in place that provides for the capture of
internal information identified as hazards is an extension of a reactive
process. It’s an extension of a reactive process since the hazard must be
known, or active, for a corrective action to be implemented.
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| Out of focus is still in view |
The
question to answer is how to respond to unknown hazards which are expected to
affect the safety of an aircraft. An unknown hazard is still a hazard that
exists. There might be conventional knowledge out there that a proactive system
that captures internal information identified as hazard closes the gap. It’s a
simple task to close the gap of a known hazard, but takes proactive leadership
to action an unknown, or latent hazard. This is where safety critical areas,
safety critical functions and the risk assessment comes into play. They key to
action unknown hazards is to treat each flight as the very first successful
flight.
It’s
true that the risk assessment is based on a known hazard, but the purpose of a
risk assessment is to establish the likelihood level of every safety critical
areas and safety critical functions. A risk assessment is not a one-time
assessment and good to go forever, but a risk assessment of airport capability,
approach, departure, aircraft and crew each the time the aircraft first move
until it stops at its destination. SMS is applying the bush-pilot concept to
safety. No matter how many times they have flown into an unprepared field, a
water aerodrome, gravel bank or the perfect runway, they own their own safety
and the awareness is on the likelihood of a successful flight.
A runway
excursion may become a major accident or a less severe incident. When an
airplane slides off a runway without any damages, your legend is the airport’s
success. One reason the excursion was without damages is due to an expectation
that an airplane will slide off one time or another. If the airport did not
include this expectation, they would not maintain their airport certificate.
Beyond the runway pavement, the runway strip is graded to a level to protect an
airplane. Objects raised above ground level are frangible to avoid damages, and
the airport has fire trucks and trained aviation firefighters on the field for
an immediate response. The one reason that the airport could maintain safety
was to expect less than perfect airline operations. If the airport did not
maintain a graded area beyond the runway or if objects above ground level were
not frangible, the outcome of an excursion could become catastrophic. When a
runway excursion ends well, your legend is our success.
Catalina9
