Saturday, April 13, 2024

Passion For Safety

Passion For Safety


By OffRoadPilots


Safety is in everyone’s interest, but not everyone has a passion for safety.

Generally, safety is defined as the condition of being protected from or unlikely to

cause danger, risk, or injury. Danger is the state of being unprotected from

external or internal forces. Risk is a probability calculation for an event to occur.

Injury is physical or emotional damages. Safety is such a broad definition that it

does not specifically describe future occurrences but is used to eliminate or reduce

opposition to implement reactive events. Air travel has a reputation for being the

safest mode of transportation. That everyone will be safe when travelling is a wish

but is not attainable unless it becomes a goal of how to eliminate danger, risk, or

injury. An aircraft may hit clear air turbulence at 41,000 feet, which then tears

apart any wishes for a safe flight. A passion for safety is not to wish for a safety

outcome, but to accept the forces of nature and work within acceptable unsafe

parameters. Any time motion is involved, such as a moving aircraft, vehicle, or

mountain climbing, there are latent condition waiting to cause danger, risk, injury.


Passion is a strong liking or

desire for or devotion to

some activity, object, or

concept. When one thinks

of passion, usually, it is the

thought of a driving force or

motion that takes over. It is

the one thing that keeps a

person going regardless of

what hurdles lay ahead and

the thing that fuel that

energizes a person when

they are feeling depleted. Passion pushes a person through difficult times when they do not what it takes to become better. Everyone have the ability to create whatever kind of future they want, but secret to living the dream is hidden in passion and what is done because of it. Passion is an emotion to be acted upon.  Without action, passion yields no worthwhile results. When a person has passion for something, they love it even when they dislike it. The difference between successful people and unsuccessful people, is that successful people, because of passion, do what unsuccessful people avoid doing.


A person who is passionate about something, they are excited to do it, even if it is

difficult or does not bring in any revenue or notoriety. When working with a

passion for an issue, time seems to fly by, and it is easy to lose track of time when

tasks are done. Passion is a tool to look forward to every challenge and task,

including going to work, and a person becomes excited when thinking about it.

A person with a passion does not mind putting in the time or effort it takes to

accomplish what it takes to achieve, and they happily will go the extra mile. A

person with a passion goes on until being totally exhausted, and then goes on for

another mile. A person with a passion only sees the horizon without an end and

love the fact that there is no end in sight. 


A person with a passion feels right about what they are doing, they feel fulfilled, and well-being. There is a purpose when working with a passion. A passion has a major definite purpose.


A definite major purpose is something that is personal. No other person can create

it for another person. A major definite purpose can be defined as the one goal that

is most important to a person. It is usually the one goal that will help a person to

achieve more of other goals than anything else to be accomplish.

Albert Einstein quote: “Every person is a genius. But if you judge a fish by its ability

to fly high, it will give its entire life believing that it is an inane”. Working with a

passion is to find the area of expertise a person is talented for, or the personal area

of intelligence. It is not for everyone to become the king of a country, or for

everyone to do sleeping tests as work. Several years ago, a person in his golden

years was stacking fertilizing bags on the production line. Every day he showed up

happy and excited to do his job. It was by many viewed as an unskilled job and

monotonous job. When asked about what the job was, he explained and show in

detail how the process worked. Plastic pebbles were dumped into the processer tobe transformed into plastic, a machine would form it into a tube, and it would go

through a cutter and sealer to finalize the product as a bag. Bags were then folded

by a machine and continued down the roller to the end where a person would

collect several bags and place each bundle on a pallet. Each bundle was stacked

systematically so that all bundles would stay on the pallet and not slide off. He had

worked this process for many, many years. His passion was to be a part of a larger

system, and a system that benefitted humanity. The bags were used to store

synthetic fertilizer.


This plant had produced

synthetic fertilizer since

1903 and was the plant

where a superior synthetic

fertilizer process was

invented. The process was

developed by an industrialist

and scientist, along with his

business partner, and based

on a method used by Henry

Cavendish in 1784. This

process was used to fix

atmospheric nitrogen into nitric acid, one of several chemical processes. The

resultant nitric acid was then used for the production of synthetic fertilizer. At this plant a tall tower as built to extract nitrogen from the air.


When packing the bags on the pallets, the passion was the larger picture, and to be

a part of a global system where synthetic fertilizer was shipped all over the world

to grow food in areas where it was difficult to grow. Packing the bags was just the

first stage in a global system where he could contribute to the process. Without his

expertise and knowledge of how to stack the bags, there would not be bags

available to ship globally. Not only was the person a part of a global process to

grow food in difficult areas, but also became a part of a Nobel Peace Prize winner scientist work to produce a robust crop to grow in places where food previously

would not grow. Working with passion is what a person makes of it.

Passion for safety in aviation is triggered by several reasons. When a young person

witnessed an aircraft towing a glider and at 300 feet the glider pilot pulled the

airbrakes and both aircraft crashed into the lake below. Some years later an

aircraft turned final at the same airport, stalled, and crashed in the river. Several

years later a Helio Courrier crashed when landing on a gravelbar in the middle of

nowhere. All accidents had two things in common, that there were no fatalities,

and the pilots made control inputs that made sense at the time, but in hindsight,

they knew what the outcome would be. None of the pilots were surprised that it

happened. Events like these triggered a young mind to make aviation safety a

passion. Aviation safety was studied, the advent of the SHELL model, the PDCA

model, human factors in aviation, flight training, and airport and aircraft design.

Over years a picture was painted of a comprehensive aviation safety system, but

still was an incomplete aviation safety system. 


The transition of knowledge from study and observations to the regulated safety management system was an easy transition since the SMS introduced processes and data analysis into the equation.


The aviation safety management system (SMS) is the industry standard for safety

in operation. SMS was initially sold as a system to save cash and to prevent future

accidents. SMS was a tool to help companies identify safety risks before they

become bigger problems, which in operations did not happen. Passion for aviation

safety was adapted by operators and their personnel. Over time the SMS did not

deliver what had been promised. Accidents still happened, and pilots continued to

make control inputs they knew in hindsight would create accidents. A prime

example is the Boeing 737-210C combi aircraft that crashed when on approach to

Runway 35T struck a hill about 1 nautical mile east of the runway. The aircraft was

destroyed by impact forces and an ensuing post-crash fire. It was not their SMS

that failed to prevent future accidents, it was the organization that operated within

a system allowing for the flight crew to lineup final approach to a non-runway.

When a system, such as the SMS appears to fail, that is the time when passion for

SMS becomes critical to success. By the way, no matter how many accidents, issues, or occurrences there are for an SMS enterprise, an SMS cannot fail since all

it does is to paint a true picture of the operations itself.


Passion for SMS is beyond a

passion for safety in

aviation. Passion for SMS is

a passion for systems,

processes, acceptable work

practices, data collection,

and process analysis. An

SMS is not at tool designed

to prevent future accidents,

since there are no data

available to determine time

and location of any next

occurrence. An SMS is in itself reactive, including the proactive component of an

SMS, since the future is unknown. The Titanic was unsinkable, and the Tenerife

disaster had two highly qualified captains. The proactive component of an SMS is

when an organization has a proactive process or system that provides for the

capture of hazards. The capture of hazards is a reactive process since these

hazards are visible and already there. Developing a hazard register is a reactive

process since it is a reaction to known hazards. A proactive SMS is a system where

hazards are nonexistent, unimaginable, or unexpected. The hazard of lining up final

approach away from the runway, was not entered into a hazard register, since the

hazard was nonexistent, unimaginable, and unexpected that it could happen. A

proactive SMS is a system where statistical process control (SPC) is applied, and

processes are assessed for common cause variations and special cause variations.

An in-control process is an acceptable process. An out-of-control process requires

a root cause analysis and corrective action plan. When using SPC as a tool to

analyse processes, the issue changes from reacting to hazards, to reacting to

processes. Using the SPC process is based on data only, is an unbiased process,

identify known hazards as common cause variations, and identify unknown hazards

as special cause variations. There are multiple rules to define a special cause variation in an SPC control chart, but a general rule is that any point above the

upper, or lower control limits are special cause variations.


When defining hazards as unknown hazards does not imply that they are not

known to the aviation industry, or that airlines or airports have not experienced

the outcome of any of the unknown hazards. An unknown hazards is applicable to

one specific operator, as opposed to a group of operators, and these hazards are

nonexistent, unimaginable, or unexpected to this specific operator. Hazards

experienced by other operators may be used a reactive process by other operators

and must be relevant to both types of operations. An example is windshear

recovery. Recovery from a windshear on approach is different from types of

aircraft. A windshear recovery by a light twin engine airplane may be different than

a single engine aircraft, a wide body aircraft may be different than a business jet

aircraft. Geolocation may also affect a windshear recovery. Windshear recovery on

the parries, may be different than in the mountains. Using the SPC process and

control charts, it becomes possible for operators to identify their own unknown

hazards, conduct root cause analyses, and implement corrective action plans to

prepare for occurrences.


When building systems with

SPC and using abstract ideas

but not having a physical or

concrete existence, it is

helpful to the process to

have a passion for the

safety management system.

A passion for safety may be

more stressful than helpful,

since there is very little

happening during normal

aircraft or airport

operations. When working with SPC and the safety management system, there is no end in

sight, and the view ahead is an endless horizon. This is a challenge for many, since

everyone feel good when they can see the result of their hard work and a tangible result at the end of the day, but with an SMS there is nothing to show for. It is impossible to distinguish between start and finish.


OffRoadPilots






Saturday, March 30, 2024

Organizational Factors

 Organizational Factors

By OffRoadPilots

When identifying contributing factors and root causes, an SMS enterprise considers human factors, supervision factors, organizational factors, and environmental factors. Organizational factors is more than how business structure of an organization, it is about how the organizational structure affect policies, processes, procedures, acceptable work practices, within the organization of the certificate.

Organizational factors are how organizations apply crew resource management to flight crew, maintenance personnel, and airport airside personnel. Crew resource management is commonly known to be used as a tool for pilots to maintain performance levels, but these principles are also suitable for airport airside personnel. Airside personnel must also

uphold a high level of integrity, and acceptable performance levels.

At large international airports, with high aircraft movements, there are time limits for how long runways, taxiways or aprons may be closed for unscheduled maintenance or activities. Crew resource management (CRM) is not to push personnel to complete tasks in an unreasonable fashion, but it is to perform tasks as expected within an assigned timeframe. This timeframe must be applicable to the task itself, and not applied as an assigned computer model for expected time. The time it takes to complete a job must include the time it takes to work within common cause variations. Common cause variations are normal variations to be expected. When driving to work daily, a common cause variation is the volume of traffic. One day it might take 30 minutes, and another day it takes 50 minutes because of traffic. A common cause variation for runway edge light maintenance is the time it takes to travel from one light to the next. This will vary every time. If crew resource management excludes common cause variations, it is not crew resource management, but micromanagement of personnel.

Organizational factors at an airport is an organization, and how this organization within the airport certificate, and the airport operations manual (AOM). Tasks conducted outside of this organization and non-airport tasks and are not required for operations. An example of a task outside of an AOM organization is to perform maintenance on access roads to the airport terminal that are outside of the airport perimeters.

An organizational crew resource management process includes seven components. CRM components are priority management, communication, comprehension, pressure, stress and fatigue, workload management, decision making, and recording and reporting.

Priority management for airside personnel to recognize priorities within their environment and to interpret cues, then discuss and select the appropriate action as appropriate.

Communication for airside personnel to communicate with clear, specific, and unambiguous communication, both verbally and written.

Comprehension for airside personnel is to comprehend the system in a 3D environment measured in time, space, and compass. Time is current and approaching time, space is current and approaching geographical location, and compass is current direction and approaching direction of travel.

Pressure, stress, and fatigue are how to respond to pressure (real or perceived) and the ability to distinguish between pressure and stress. Applying checklists and standard operating procedures are tools for pressure and stress management. The difference between pressure and stress is that stress can be defined as the internal resistive force to upcoming, or unexpected tasks, while pressure can be defined as the amount of perceived, or physical force applied to complete upcoming or unexpected tasks. Communication of progress is a tool for pressure and stress management. Accepting the current status of job performance is a tool for pressure and stress management. An SMS enterprise operating with a conforming safety management system, has developed and implemented a non-punitive reporting policy to reduce pressure, stress and fatigue. Pressure and stress are contributing factors for fatigue, and fatigue is a contributing factor for incidents and accidents.

Workload management is goal setting and time management. The airside rundown system is a workload tool for airside personnel to manage operational tasks. Workloads management is also to prioritize multiple blocks of acceptable work- load tasks. During an emergency at the airport, workload management and prioritizing tasks becomes vital for successful airport operations.

Decision making is a process, and there are 7 steps in a successful decision-making process. A decision is a job performance decision, and a decision based on past airside experience, training received, airport operations flow, airport operations conforming to regulatory requirements or reactions vital to avoid hazards, incidents, or accidents. Airside decision making is not to invent new processes, but to apply current processes. New process suggestions are submitted as hazard reports, or as directive by the accountable executive.

Identify the problem or opportunity. The first step in making the right decision is recognizing the problem or opportunity and deciding to address it.

Decision making process step 2.
Gather information to make a decision based on facts and data.

Decision making process step 3.
Identify alternatives. 
Once the issue, or hazard is comprehended, it’s time to identify the various solutions.

Decision making process step 4. Weigh the evidence.

Decision making process step 5.
Choose among alternatives. Conduct a risk assessment to comprehend what direct risks, and residual risks are involved. This also includes an on-the-spot informal, or metal risk assessment if a decision was already implemented.

Decision making process step 6.
Take action. Create a corrective action plan for implementation.

Decision making process step 7.
Review, monitor and evaluate the implementation for effectiveness.

An example of a decision-making process is if the driver of an airside vehicle on the ramp observes an aircraft is taxiing on the ramp, towards their position. A decision to be made is to stay or move. In a similar scenario, an airside vehicle driver is in a vehicle on the ramp and observes an aircraft is parked with the engine running. The driver has an urgent task to be completed and the common vehicle route is to drive in front of where the aircraft is parked. A decision to be made is to wait for aircraft to taxi or take an alternate route.

Recording and reporting is to record findings on the daily inspection form, or on an electronic device. Paper forms are still circulating but are slowly disappearing. Report recordings to the safety management system.

Within the organizational environment of airport operators is the daily inspection process. A daily inspection may be performed several times per day. Inspections are pursuant to the schedule in the airport operations manual. The AOM is the organization in which airport operations lives. There are generally three responsibilities positions at an airport. These are the airfield maintainer, who maintains the airport to compliance level with airport standards. The next level is the airport manager, who is responsible for airport operations manual maintenance, process assignments, and monitor daily for airport regulations and standards compliance. The oversight level is the airport general manager, who also is an accountable executive (AE) and responsible on behalf of the certificate holder to maintain compliance with a required regulations.

An airport certificate is its own organization since a certificate is issued to a land- parcel, as opposed to a person. The certificate holder is the person who manages and administers airport certificate tasks and actions. The certificate holder is person who most likely is a member of the airport authority and their organization. A certificate holder may also be a third-party contractor, in which that person has the final authority in airport decisions.

When analyzing the effect of organizational factors, both the certificate organization, (if airside standards conform), and the airport authority organization, (if the airport authority organizational flow supports required activities under the certificate). Simplified, just as an aircraft within its own environment, or organizational flow must maintain compliance with all components and functional requirements, an airport certificate must comply with its own surveyed, determined, recorded, and reported compliance factors within its own environment or organization.

Airport operations is more complex than any other functions in aviation. An airport operator must have comprehensive knowledge of airport operations itself, must have operational knowledge of air navigation services, and must be familiar with all types of aircraft operations. An airport operations manual is the organization that contains all airport operations functions.

The AOM is a document that describes the airport organization, and is a document that describes physical characteristics, or the layout, describes airside operations plans, is approved by the airport operator (AE) and the regulatory, is a legal reference document, describes who is in the administration, the largest aircraft that can use the airport, and hours of operations.

The AOM describes the organizational chart, line of authority and line of reporting. Since the work a contractor does affects the accountable executive’s responsibilities, regulatory compliance and safety performance, a contractor is a like-employee person. The AOM lists documents, manuals and guidance material that must be available for airport operations, audits, and regulatory inspections.

The airport obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS), or maximum heights of structure is controlled by airport zoning regulations and incorporated by reference in the AOM. The AOM describes the airport organization and level of authority, it describes the airport organization and level of authority, describes airport lighting systems, describes runways identified by numbers, taxiway identified by letters, excluding the letter X, and aprons by Roman numerals. An AOM describes markers (elevated above ground) and markings (displayed on the ground surface) and describes airport facilities (may be outside of airport lands) and airside services, and more. It is a prerequisite to assess and define applicable organizational factors within an AOM prior to assessing a root cause how airport authority organizational factors affected the outcome. If the systems within the AOM are not identified, the root cause and corrective action plan may be incorrectly assigned.

Human factors and organizational factors are closely related, with a defined difference. The difference is that human factors is about human reactions to inputs, and organizational factors are the climate, or culture environment imposed on personnel.

Human error is a symptom, not the cause, it is a starting point in root cause analysis, not the conclusion, and it is a symptom of trouble deeper inside an organizational system.

Organizational factors to consider in a root cause analysis are SMS policies, processes, procedures, and acceptable work practices. Organizational climate, structure, chain of command, delegation of authority, communication, accountability, policies, culture, just-culture and more. Assign a weight score between 1 and 4 to each factor and to each one of the 5-Ws + How. The factor with the highest weight score is assigned as the root cause factor and the factor where the CAP needs to be applied. If two weight scores are equal, apply the highest “Why” score as the determining factor.

Just as the square root of a number is defined as the value, which gives the number when it is multiplied by itself, an incident root cause is the value, identified by a number, which is most likely to quadruple in value when the same incident happens one additional time.

When organizational factors are determined to be the highest root cause probability, a corrective action plan must address the current organizational system in both the operational system, and airport or airline authority certificate system.

OffRoadPilots




Saturday, March 16, 2024

Supervision Factors

 Supervision Factors

By OffRoadPilots

When identifying contributing factors and root causes, an SMS enterprise considers human factors, supervision factors, organizational factors, and environmental factors. Every person is working under supervision, knowing it or not. A CEO of a corporation is supervised, and a AE of an SMS enterprise is supervised. Everyone is supervised in one way or another, and everybody got to serve somebody. Types of supervision also depends on what is being supervised. Different types of supervision are required for education than for operational control, fundamental task supervision is different than auxiliary task supervision, academic task supervision is different than practical application task supervision, and process compliance supervision is different than process output supervision. Every task comes with a supervision factor which depends on what task is supervised.

Micromanagement is considered a form of supervision, it is used by many and is in their opinion an excellent method and the preferred method of supervision. However, micromanagement is not supervision but management. Micromanagement is where managers feel the need to control aspects of their employee's work and decision-making to an extreme degree, more than is necessary or healthy for a usual working relationship. There is a difference between management and supervision. In general terms, management is how businesses organize and direct workflow, operations, and personnel to meet company goals. The primary goal of management is to create an environment that lets employees work efficiently and productively, and they use supervision as a process tool for oversight to remain on target for their goal. Micromanagement is not suitable for an SMS enterprise, since it does not promote trust, learning, accountability, or information sharing. Within a micromanagement system there is only one way, process, or method, which is decided by the manager. In a micromanagement system, a manager has previously demanded that a root cause analysis of an independent third-party operator to justify penalties and punitive actions.

The different levels of supervision are direct supervision, which supervisor gives specific instructions on all assignments. Work is reviewed for completeness and accuracy, or personnel performs tasks which provide inherent checks built into the nature of the work. Reviewing work is different from micromanaging work. General supervision is when the supervisor provides continuing or individual assignments by indicating generally what is to be done, limitations, quality and quantity expected, deadlines and priorities. Additional, specific instructions are given for new, difficult, or unusual assignments. Personnel uses initiative in carrying out recurring assignments. The supervisor assures that the work is technically accurate and in compliance with instructions or established procedures. Intermittent supervision is when a supervisor makes assignments by defining objectives, priorities, and deadlines, and assists personnel with unusual situations that do not have clear objectives. Intermittent supervision is when personnel plans and carries out successive steps and resolves problems and deviations in accordance with instructions, policies, and accepted practices. The supervisor reviews the work for technical adequacy and conformance with practice and policy. Administrative supervision is when a supervisor sets the overall objectives and resources available. Both supervisor and personnel, in consultation, develop deadlines, projects, and work to be done. Personnel plans and carries out the assignment, resolves most of the conflicts, coordinates work with others and interprets policy on own initiative. Personnel keeps the supervisor informed of progress, potentially controversial matters, or far-reaching implications. General direction is when assignments are made in terms of broad practice, precedents, policies, and goals. Work may be reviewed for fulfillment of program objectives and conformance with departmental policy and practice. Long-Range administrative direction is when personnel generally proceed independently in accordance with general plans, policies, and purposes of the department. Results of work are considered technically authoritative and are normally accepted without significant change. Any of these levels of supervision are compatible with an aviation safety management system.

Each level of supervision is linked to a type of supervision. Types of supervision is determined by the way in which work is assigned, when it is reviewed, how it is reviewed, and what guidelines, prototypes and protocols are available.

Close supervision is when personnel are assigned duties according to specific procedures. Work is checked frequently, and in addition there may be formal training. Regular supervision is when personnel perform a variety of routine duties within established policies and procedures or by referral to the supervisor’s guidelines. General supervision is when personnel develop procedures for performance of variety of duties or performs complex duties within established policy guidelines. Direction supervision is when personnel establish procedures for attaining specific goals and objectives in a broad area of work. Only the final results of work done are typically reviewed. Personnel typically develops procedures within the limits of established policy guidelines. General direction is when personnel receive guidance in terms of broad goals and overall objectives and is responsible for establishing the methods to attain them. Generally, personnel are in charge of an area of work, and typically formulates policy for this area but does not necessarily have final authority for approving policy. Any one of these types of supervision are compatible with an aviation safety management system. In a simple format, types of supervision are structural, participative, servant-leader, freedom-thinking, and transformational leadership.

When supervision factors are applied to a root cause analysis, it is critical for a successful outcome that it is applied appropriately to the analysis. Conventional wisdom is that any errors within root cause factors are human errors. However, human error is a subfactor of human factors.

The first step in analyzing supervision factors is to conduct a root cause analysis and assign one of the four factors to the root cause. Both the fishbone, and the 5-why root cause analyses are acceptable tools. The fishbone provides both visual and text links in the root cause process, while the 5-why is a text and matrix analysis. When applying the 5-why method, a matrix of 5 options and 5 considerations should be used. One reason for a 25-point matrix is to reduce the probability for subjective answers. After answering the first few questions subjectively, there is only one way to continue, which is to look at each answer objectively. Another reason for the 25-point matrix is that the first answer to the first question leads to a predetermined root cause. If the question is why an airplane crashed, a subjective answer could be that the pilot lost control. As the questions goes down the pilot lost control avenue, the outcome is focusing on the pilot only. An objective answer to the same question could be facts of events, such as a wing suddenly banked 60 degrees upon landing. An objective answer leads down the avenue of fact findings of events, as opposed to the avenue of pilot actions. When there is a matrix of 25 answers, there is a higher probability to capture the correct root cause, and it forces a person to think.

The root cause analysis is not the end, but the beginning of corrective action plans (CAP). Establish the root cause based on the most likely probability in the 25-point matrix. One or multiple column may be combined to assign the most probable root cause. A root cause cap must be linked to an objective, or establish a new objective, and linked to a safety policy goal.

General types are structural, participative, servant-leader, freedom-thinking, and transformational leadership.

Assign a weight score between 1 and 4 to each factor and to each one of the 5-Ws + How. The factor with the highest weight score is assigned as the root cause factor and the factor where the CAP needs to be applied. If two weight scores are equal, apply the highest “Why” score as the determining factor.

When supervision factors are determined to be the highest root cause probability, a corrective action plan must address the current supervision system, which can be extremely difficult to accept by an SMS enterprise. Acceptance and accountability are the only tools available to improve regulatory compliance and safety in operations little by little.

OffRoadPilots


Saturday, March 2, 2024

Environmental Factors

Environmental Factors

By OffRoadPilots 

When identifying contributing factors and root cause, an SMS enterprise considers human factors, supervision factors, organizational factors, and environmental factors. These factors support their safety management system (SMS) policy on which the safety management system (SMS) is based, goalsetting system, process to identify hazards, training system, reporting system, communication system, quality assurance system, audit system, and they support their tasks for airlines and airports to operate with a comprehensive and compliant safety management system.

Environmental factors are comprehensive factors affecting SMS, since there are several subcategories included. Environmental factors encompass geographical location, climate, ecological, illumination, terrain, natural accelerated events, operational environment, workplace, design, equipment, communication, and more. Within each subcategory there are multiple secondary categories, and complementary categories. Environmental factors can be scaled down to detail-reliability in processes. When details are defined, a process may be simplified for the end user.

Geographical locations are located within the four categories of airmasses. These airmasses are artic, tropical, polar, and equatorial. Arctic air masses form in the Arctic region and are very cold. Tropical air masses form in low-latitude areas and are moderately warm. Polar airmasses take shape in high-latitude regions and are cold. Equatorial air masses develop near the Equator and are warm. Secondary categories of the geo location subcategory are regional and local phenomena.

Regional and local phenomena include uninhabited areas located within any of the four airmasses.

The climate subcategory is the long-term pattern of weather in a region. Weather changes from hour-to-hour, day-to-day, month-to-month or even year-to-year. Regional weather patterns tracked for at least 30 years, are considered its climate.

The ecological subcategory is how landscape patterns are precisely described patterns into ecosystem units based on similar climate, landscape, vegetation, and soil conditions. This provides for a common ecological language and framework to classify ecosystem units and support land and resource management. Illumination, sunlight, and darkness are subcategories of environmental factors. Illumination may be hangar lighting, and type of lighting. Some types of lights may cause colors to blend, while other types are bright and causing shadows. Sunlight, or lack of sunlight, including grey zones, are factors affecting aircraft operations, and maintenance and flight crew performance.

Terrain is another environmental factor. Terrain ranges from the shorelines at the three coasts, tundra and the arctic, the level prairies, to rolling hills, the foothills and to the rugged and rocky mountains.

Some of the natural accelerated events are earthquakes, blizzards, floods, avalanches, mudslides, volcanic activity, thunderstorms, and more. Some subfactors may also overlap into other factors.

The operational environment is a subfactor of the environment. An operational environment is different than the workplace, it is about the workspace. An operational environment is allocating operational workspace in 3D, and measured in time (speed), space (location), and compass (direction). A workspace is flight crew chairs design, the time for a pilot to reach an item to complete a task, the location in the cockpit of the item, and its direction from the pilot’s chair. In the old PBY-5A (Canso), the two generator’s circuit breakers are placed on the bulkhead behind the captain. Should the “left” generator fail, it becomes the “right” generator for the pilots when pulling the breaker.

The workplace environment is the place where there is interaction between workers. It’s a location where you turn up for work, it is an office space, pilot’s room, maintenance hangar or locations where you meet co-workers, discuss work, brainstorm, conduct meetings, and get work done.

A design environment is the process of addressing surrounding environmental parameters when devising plans, programs, policies, buildings, or products. It seeks to create spaces that will enhance the natural, social, cultural, and physical environment of particular areas.

The communication environment is about tools used to communicate. The old way to call loudly across the room has changed and improved by using electronic communication means. Information technology department is communication environment tool to communicate effectively within the organization, and to maintain communication records.

Equipment is a subfactor of the environment and includes machines and equipment, people and manpower, materials, and measurement. The equipment itself could be an aircraft, a vehicle, a towing tug, maintenance tools, computers, manual calculator tools, and more.

Environmental factors are the outsider of the other three factors. Human factors, organizational factors and supervision factors are all in their own special way linked to human behavior.


 

The climate affects areas of both airline operations and maintenance, and airport operations. The aviation is operating daily between the South and the North Poles. Airport and runways may be ice or snow runways, dessert sand, rivers, lakes or just a narrow mountain trail. Maintenance is performed in suitable hangars, or outside in rain, snow, wind, and in places with extreme cold or extreme hot. In many areas there are still places with no or limited communication availability, except for using satellite telephone. An aircraft without the 406ELT is difficult to locate in any weather conditions. Bush pilots all over the globe have experienced accidents and destruction of airplanes. Over the years airplanes have crashed in the middle of nowhere in 40 below temperatures and 40 above, and some pilots survived, while other did not. The climate affects survival probabilities and rescue time. Climate may also cause illusions, such as mirages. Several years ago, a large aircraft crashed when the runway lights were “lifted up” by an inversion and the airport viewed as being closer than what it actually was. Operators, pilots, and maintenance crew working in these extreme climate areas deserve a medal of honor for overcoming challenges and providing excellent services to people who live here.

The ecological factor is affecting the aviation more and more every year. Over millions of years the climate has changed from ice ages to hot climate. Currently ecological factors are assigned the root case for the current climate. Regulations are changed to support these opinions and operators must maintain compliance for continued operations. Natural resources are assigned contributor factors to the climate, and that current use is deteriorating the ecological environment. Airports may not be able to build, or extend their runways to service increasingly larger aircraft, or to improve fuelling areas for time consuming refuelling. Ecological factors are a limiting factors for the future of aviation.

Illumination, sunlight, and darkness are factors affecting flight and maintenance operations. Aircraft need landing lights, airports need runway edge lights, and maintenance hangars need floodlights. Type of lighting source affects operational performance and compliance. In a maintenance hangar where the floodlights are of the old type, colors in the yellow spectrum blends in with their surroundings, and other parts transform to the grey color spectrum. Bright floodlights to resemble brightness of sunlight is needed for maintenance to perform their obligations. Strong illumination from landing lights is required for a pilot to view an extended length of the runway beyond the aircraft. Runway edge lights are required to define the limits of usable runway areas, and their intensity may vary depending on weather conditions.

Terrain is another environmental factor affecting airports, airlines, and maintenance activities. It might not be immediate obvious that terrain affects maintenance activities since most maintenance is performed inside a hangar. However, terrain affects the decision of where to build a hangar, and the loadbearing capacity for taxiway or taxiroute to the facility. For outside maintenance terrain is a crucial factor to work in a stable environment. A helicopter may be in need of maintenance on a mountain range, or somewhere in the boreal forest. Terrain affects airports and airport design. There are airports that do not meet the obstacle clearance limitations and therefore unable to be certified airports. Airlines my required travel several additional miles for approach procedures compliance, burn additional fuel and add time to the flight crew’s duty day.

Accelerated events affects airports and airlines both seasonally and regionally and are contained within a relatively limited area. Volcanic ash from one single volcano outbreak, may be the only event that affects aircraft operations globally. Snowstorms, hurricane, or tornadoes may be spread over a large area, but are relatively regionally limited to for the safe operations of an airport or aircraft.

The operational environment is an environment where personnel feel good about working. It is the place where a person is located, a place that is home-away-from- home, and it is the place a person enjoys coming every day. An operational environment is about performance and how processes are designed to be userfriendly and reliable repetitious.

The workplace environment is different than the operational environment, in that it is designed by the six-sigma principle. The six-sigma is a set of methodologies and tools used to improve business processes by reducing defects and errors, minimizing variation, and increasing quality and efficiency. The goal of Six Sigma is to achieve a level of quality that is nearly perfect, by being tailored to human behaviors. A structured approach is to define, measure, measure, analyze, and improve applying the principles in their SMS safety risk management.

A design environment is a fluid environment where persons are tailored to individual and specific needs. An example is the popularity of a standing work-desks. A design environment is not to adapt to personal opinions and request daily, but to assess their inquiries as it relates to their work environment. Several years ago, a pilot was not allowed to fly bush planes with clogs, since this caused a hazard to for the footwear to be stuck between the pedals and the pilot’s ability to quickly escape a sinking floatplane. A design environment needs justification for design, and there are no requirements for everyone to wear the same shoes.

In the communication environment practical communication tools are used. In the infant years of airport control towers, clearances were given by light signals. As technology continued to change, radio communications become the standard method. As technology is changing rapidly other means of communication were implemented and are continuing with new technologies. Changes in technology requires training sessions to be familiar with new communication and supervised use until personnel easily can use these tools. One example is the online SiteDocs cloudbased SMS program. It takes information sessions to become familiar, and as it is used, it becomes a second nature.

The equipment environment is a broad definition of what to include. Anything that are equipment or tools are included. There is also an interaction between the equipment environment and other environment. These are not defined lines written in rocks between the different environments, but they are rugged, fluid, and flexible. Rugged and fluid lines may be a distraction to personnel, and it becomes the responsibility of management to conduct regular information sessions about the organization and its operation.

Environmental factors are simple to apply within a safety management system when processes are linked to regulatory requirements.

OffRoadPilots



Saturday, February 17, 2024

Human Factors

Human Factors

By OffRoadPilots 

Human factors and human errors are two separate things but are often used interchangeable in conversations and in the aviation industry. Human errors are attached to a person who could be linked to an occurrence. In addition, the severity of the outcome is a predetermining factor how important it is to assign human error as the root cause after an accident.

Human error root cause analysis has widespread support from the aviation industry. However, with the implementation of the Safety Management System (SMS) regulations, accountability came into play, and it became impossible to justify human error as the root cause.

A healthy SMS looks at the organization and its systems, and the fact that a person overlooked, or missed an item is no longer a root cause, such as a pilot missing a checklist item. Checklists are required and are used for any flight, but there is no evidence a missed checklist item was the root cause of any accidents. At the other end of the spectrum, completing the gear-down checklist item was a contributing factor to a fatal accident in 1972. A descent went undetected when the flight crew became focused on a checklist item.

Human error is a symptom of trouble deeper inside a system or an organization. On the other hand, human error is also a symptom of a successful organization. There are organizations where human errors are integrated with the system and need to be there for the organization to exist and prosper. It is the system itself that is set up for human errors.

Conventional wisdom is that human error is a” bad” thing when using emotions to describe an event. Human error is a sub-category of human factors. Simplified, human factors are how a person react when one or more of the five senses, vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch are triggered. Human factors are also how external forces, or events, e.g., fatigue, weather, illumination and more, affect performance.

In an organization where there are overwhelming events of human errors, the organization operates within a system that is prone to these errors. An example is Daytona 500, or Reno Air Races, where the systems (race to win) are setting each driver and pilot up for human error, or a crash. Both the Daytona 500 and Reno Air Race organizers have requirements and systems in place to reduce harm to drivers, pilots, or spectators, but these systems are designed for human errors. Imagine how successful Daytona 500 would be if the speed was limited to 50MPH, or if the Reno Air Race required airplanes to fly between gates separated a mile apart.

Civil aviation industry systems are not set up as systems where human errors are desirable, but occurrences still happens because aviation operational systems allow for it. Civil aviation systems are not as obvious as the racing-systems to promote human errors, but they both happens because of human and organizational factors, and to get the job done before closing time.

The aviation industry struggles with the human error concept. This struggle affects their organizational environment, and a trap to fall into is to make pilot, or human errors the root cause. However, the safety management system requires operators to look inward into the organizational systems to repair or replace one or more systems. If a process is stable and undesirable, but not broke, the process should not be fixed. The old saying that “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” holds true in aviation safety. A stable, or desirable process may from time to tome turn out faulty items and mistakes. Reacting to these mistakes is tampering with the process contributing to an increase in future errors. Tampering with a stable process moves the process closer to a point to become a contributing factor to accidents.

Several years ago, a pilot and three passengers went on a mountain flight with a PA-28-140. The aircraft was full of fuel and above max gross weight at takeoff. As often, when there are no other adverse conditions, the flight departed safely, and slowly climbed into the valley towards the taller mountains.

While the winds were relatively calm at the airport, on this day the winds were extremely strong in the mountains. One pilot had earlier that day refused to take the scenic flight because of the mountain winds, but another pilot accepted.

The pilot banked and turned for the passengers to see the beauty of the mountains. Before the pilot could react, the aircraft stalled and crashed. A close friend found them later the next day in a highly remote area.

Human and organizational factors are often linked together in the text but are two separate factors. Human factors are how human reacts to inputs, while organizational factors are the result, or output, of these reactions. The term organizational factors encompass all elements that influence the way that an organization, and everybody within it, behave. Some of these elements are formal management systems, assurance processes, working practices, whether or not formally documented, risk awareness, how the organization learns from experience, organizational safety culture and more.

A safety policy is directed at human factors. Safety for an airport or airline is to maintain the confidence of the travelling public and safety of the aviation industry is vital to success. Through the introduction of a safety management system, an airport is committing to provide a systemic, explicit, and comprehensive process for managing airside safety risks. By embracing this safety management system, airports establish safety as an integral part of an airport culture where they recognize that safety is paramount.

Human factors is a scientific study that evaluates and comprehend human interactions and human behaviors in relation to other human and elements of a workplace system. The human factors five senses reactive or proactive affect human behavior and performance. These senses are vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.


The SHELL model is a model of human factors interactions and includes the software(S), hardware(H), environment(E), liveware, other(L), liveware, self(L).

Software are regulations, standards, policies, job descriptions, expectations, and other intangible items.

Hardware are the physical and tangible items housing intangible items. Hardware are electronic devices, documents, tools, airfield, and other tangible items. The environment has multiple sub-categories. A sub-category of the environment is the designed environment. A design environment is user friendly environment, design and layout, accessibility, tasks-flow, and more. The social environment is about distancing, both physical contact between persons and distancing between equipment and objects, experiences, culture, language and more.

The climate is another sub-category of the environment. Climate environment includes geo location, weather, temperature, and more. Amy these human factors has an affect human behavior in one way or another.

When one or more of the human senses are targeted by inputs, or when interactions between the elements of the SHELL model are incompatible, the effect on human reaction, or process output, are commonly known as human errors, or pilot errors.

Human errors are not errors, but reactions to the operational SHELL model system, and human senses are reactions they are exposed to by the system itself.

OffRoadPilots


Saturday, February 3, 2024

Regulatory Conforming Processes

 Regulatory Conforming Processes

By OffRoadPilots

Regulatory conforming processes are processes producing outputs that conform to regulatory requirements. There are three fundamental tasks required when building regulatory performing processes. The first task is the research for input task, the second task is the process design and development task, and the third is the regulatory identification and assignment task. A process must be linked to one regulatory requirement. In a healthy SMS environment, a process is linked to several regulations, or several standards, and to the SMS policy.

The research for input task is a comprehensive research of regulatory requirements for airport or airline operations. In addition to airport or airline regulations, multiple other federal or local regulations may be applicable, such as environment regulation, transportation of the public regulations, and other regulations. However, when researching regulatory requirements for the purpose of building a conforming process, only airport or airline operations regulations are researched for inputs. These are the regulations that an airport or airline operating certificate is tied to and dependant on for its existence. Performance-based regulations are based on a 95% confidence level.

Regulatory research also includes a comprehensive research of standard requirements for airport or airline operations. Standards are also performance- based in the same way as the regulations are. Airport standards has been adapted for use in an operational concept to reflect and support the operational reality of aircraft capabilities and performance specifications. An airport standard establishes a level of service for an airline and its fleet. Rapidly changing technologies in aircraft performance and avionics have a very real potential to impact future aerodrome operations. An increase in the size of critical aircraft or the provision of lower landing, departure or taxi limits will require the aerodrome operator to re-assess the aerodrome facilities and operational procedures to ensure they provide the required standards.

Accuracy requirements for aeronautical data are based upon a 95% confidence level and in that respect, three types of positional data are identified. Positional data are surveyed points e.g. runway threshold, calculated points, e.g. mathematical calculations from the known surveyed points of thresholds for determination of the aerodrome reference point, and declared points, e.g. flight information region boundary points. The confidence level is in the method, or process itself, and is not in a particular confidence interval. If the sampling method was repeated many times, 95% of the intervals constructed would capture the true population mean. As the sample size increases, the range of interval values will narrow, meaning that a larger sample size, or an increased number of data collected, the mean of the sample will generate a much more accurate result if compared with a smaller sample, or fewer tasks completed.

There is a misconception among operators that a 95% confidence level is the same as airports or airlines being 95% safe. Conventional wisdom is that the application of numerical safety levels, such as airline ratings are indications of what level the public are protected from harm when an airline has achieved the maximum 7 of 7 in their rating. An airline rating level takes several other parameters into account, such as staff friendliness, service availability and more to provide a complete travel experience safety level. In the same way as airline ratings apply several parameters in their assessment, airline and airports do the same in their operational assessment oversight. There are therefore no contradictions between a 95% confidence level and a 100% safety rating level, or rated 7/7.

A 95% confidence level is that established safety performance indicators (SPI) and safety performance targets (SPT) will fall within their expectations 95 of 100 times. An airline may establish a confidence level of 95% that their pilots will touch down within the first 1/3 of the runway. For the same airline to establish a 100% confidence level, the airline needs to operate with an expectation that their pilots will touch down anywhere on the full length of the runway 100 of 100 times. A targeted 95% confidence level is therefore safer in operations than a targeted 100% confidence level, which does not provide enough stopping distance for a pilot who used up all of the runway before landing.

The next step is the process design and development task. When designing processes, the objective is to produce an operational sound outcome. At this stage in the design process, regulations, standards, and the SMS policy are considered, but they are not applied to the process design. The reason for considering regulations but not applying regulations, is that an easy trap to fall into is to build a regulatory process. In a regulatory process an airliner captain must fly the regulations when they need to fly the process. E.g. if a regulation, or flight operational quality assurance expectation requires a pilot not to bank an aircraft beyond 25 degrees angle, the wind could push the aircraft into an undesired position, as opposed to flying the process when a pilot would increase the bank angle to maintain aircraft control. A goal when building processes, is for processes be practical to use, and with a task-flow that make sense to users.

Regulations are objective and impartial to a process, while safety is subjective and biased. Regulatory compliance is the priority, while safety is paramount. Maintaining continued regulatory compliance is the foundation and building blocks for the existence of an airport or airline certificate. When safety is paramount, it becomes the highest-ranking order of a system, and regulatory priority is the only tool to maintain safety as the highest-ranking order. Just as an accountable executive is the highest-ranking order of a safety management system, regulatory compliance is the operational priority to maintain that order.

An airport has an obligation to operate with a runway environment that maintains continuous regulatory compliance. This is achieved in multiple ways when each activity or task is linked to a regulatory requirement. One task several airports have adapted, is the daily inspection task. This is not a regulated task, but by using the process daily, they are engaged in activities, or processes, that conforms to regulatory compliance. The key to success is to comprehend what regulatory requirements each activity is linked to.

The last step is the regulatory identification and assignment task, which is to conduct a process analysis to verify what tasks within the process are lined to a regulation. A process compliance analysis is conducted backwards, starting from the end result and output, and move backwards until the beginning. Any broken link in the process must be closed for compliance.


After all broken links are closed, the next step is to analyze the process forward and apply compliance to each step in the process. There will also be steps that are not linked to aviation regulations, such as checking the vehicle before operating airside. Compliance requirements are linked to tasks performed while conducting the inspection. One task may be linked to multiple regulations, and one regulation may be linked to multiple tasks. Comprehensive knowledge of the regulations is required to perform these tasks. The accountable executive is the person who is responsible for compliance with all regulations and is also the person who is the final authority for assigning regulations to tasks.

When regulatory conforming processes are built, implemented, and communicated to workers, compliance becomes simple. Airport or airline workers does not need to change how they work, or how things are done, but are simply completing their processes as expected. Over time as data becomes available, the only task left is to enter data into a statistical process control system for control charts to be produced and analyzed.

The beauty of operating with regulatory linked processes, is that all information is available to airport and airline operators when safety performance is analyzed, and when the regulator conducts inspections.

OffRoadPilots

COVID-19 AND BIRDS

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