RISK MATRIX WITH ANSWERS

RISK MATRIX WITH ANSWERS

By OffRoadPilots

Aviation safety management requires more than assigning a colour or

numerical score to a reported hazard. A comprehensive Safety

Management System (SMS) must provide a consistent process that begins

when a report is received, protects the operation through immediate

securing actions, evaluates the hazard using defined criteria, determines

the required organizational response, and follows the issue through

investigation, corrective action, monitoring, and follow-up. The attached

10×10 risk matrix and supporting definitions provide this broader capability

and therefore offer significant advantages over a conventional 5×5 matrix. 

The principal advantage of the 10×10 matrix is analytical resolution. A 5×5

matrix provides twenty-five likelihood-and-severity combinations, while a

10×10 matrix provides one hundred combinations. Aviation hazards

frequently differ only incrementally in frequency, consequence, oroperational exposure. When only five categories are available, materially different hazards can be forced into the same classification. 

Ten likelihood and ten severity levels allow the assessor to identify smaller but

operationally important differences, improving prioritization and reducing

the possibility that developing risk remains hidden within a broad category.

The definitions are essential because they establish a common language

for risk assessment. Likelihood is divided into ten levels: Inconceivable,

Rarely, Remotely, Randomly, Variable, Occasionally, Often, Frequently,

Regularly, and Systematically. These definitions describe progressively

increasing recurrence characteristics rather than leaving personnel to

interpret vague terms such as “unlikely” or “likely.” For example, Rarely

represents circumstances beyond factors applied in operational problem-

solving, while Frequently describes a reliable and dependable occurrence.

Regularly identifies short, constant, dependable intervals, and

Systematically identifies methodical, planned, dependable occurrence. 

This structure allows reports, operational experience, records, and observed

trends to be translated into a repeatable likelihood determination.

Severity is also divided into ten levels, ranging from Informational through

Negligible, Minor, Low, Considerable, Major, Significant, Hazardous, Critical,

and Catastrophic. The progression provides greater discrimination between

an observation having no compatible consequence and a condition capable

of producing irreversible harm, damage, loss, crisis, accident, or disaster.

This is especially valuable in aviation because hazards can share similar

likelihood but have substantially different potential outcomes. Defined

severity terminology helps ensure that assessments are based on the

credible consequence of the hazard rather than the assessor’s personal

perception of importance.

A further strength is the separate Exposure scale. Exposure ranges from

Level I, Annually, through biannual, quarterly, monthly, weekly, seven-day,

daily, 12-hour, hourly, and Level X, 15-minute intervals. Exposure asks how

often the operation is actually subjected to the identified hazard. This

distinction is important because likelihood and exposure are related but are

not identical. A hazard with a relatively low probability of producing an

occurrence can become operationally significant when aircraft, crews,

maintenance personnel, or ground personnel are repeatedly exposed to it.

The matrix therefore establishes risk from likelihood and severity and then

requires exposure to be considered before the final Safety Risk Level (SRL)

is assigned. 

This creates a more dynamic assessment than a basic 5×5

calculation. Increased operational exposure can elevate the risk level even

when the inherent severity remains unchanged. Conversely, effective

controls that reduce exposure can be recognized during subsequentassessment. The matrix becomes a management instrument for changing

operational conditions rather than merely a static scoring table.

Importantly, the definitions

establish what must

happen after a hazard

report is received.

Immediate securing

actions come first. These

are the actions necessary

to protect people, aircraft,

equipment, property, and

the operation from

immediate harm. Securing

the situation is not the

corrective action and does not close the report. Once immediate safety has been established, the defined assessment process begins. Personnel

identify the hazard, determine its exposure level, determine the likelihood of the time between hazard intervals, and determine the credible severity.

The resulting SRL then provides the first structured organizational action

after securing actions are complete. SRL 1 requires Communicate; SRL 2

adds Monitor; SRL 3 adds Pause; SRL 4 adds Suspend; and SRL 5 adds

Cease. This progressive structure is particularly valuable because the risk

assessment produces an operational decision rather than simply

generating documentation. Communication remains necessary throughout

escalating levels, while progressively stronger controls are introduced as

risk increases. 

A high-risk report therefore cannot disappear into an

administrative queue while unsafe exposure continues.The associated priority levels further define when the first action must occur. Level 1 requires action upon notification, Level 2 within 24 hours, Level 3 within seven days, Level 4 within one month, Level 5 within three

months, Level 6 within 12 months, and Level 7 may be up to 36 months.

This provides management with a practical method for allocating

resources according to urgency while maintaining visibility of lower-priority

issues. It also gives hazard owners a documented basis for explaining

decisions to employees and management, supporting transparency,

accountability, consistent escalation, and organizational learning across all

future operations.

The definitions also connect risk assessment with Quality Assurance.

Following initial assessment and required operational action, the process

identifies investigation, trend investigation, determination of Special Cause

Variation, root cause analysis, Special Cause Variation root cause,

Corrective Action Plan (CAP), assignment of the CAP, monitoring, and

follow-up. This sequence is important because a report should not be

considered resolved simply because the immediate unsafe condition was

secured. Securing controls the immediate situation; investigation

determines what happened; root cause analysis determines why it

happened when special cause variation exists; corrective action addresses

the organizational causes; and monitoring and follow-up verify that the

corrective action is effective.

Compared with a 5×5 matrix, this framework therefore provides a more

complete bridge between Safety Risk Management and Safety Assurance.

It supports initial classification, exposure adjustment, operational

response, investigation, corrective action, and verification. The additional

categories also improve trend analysis because smaller changes in

occurrence frequency or consequence can become visible before they

develop into unacceptable risk.The 10×10 model must nevertheless be applied with disciplined human judgment. 

Additional categories should not be mistaken for mathematical

certainty. Definitions must be incorporated into SMS procedures, personnel

must be trained to apply them consistently, and assessments should use

reports, operational records, maintenance information, investigations, and

other available evidence. Management should periodically calibrate

assessments to ensure different hazard owners interpret the definitions

consistently.

Overall, the 10×10 matrix is

preferred for comprehensive aviation SMS analysis because it

does more than rank

hazards. Its defined

likelihood, severity, and

exposure scales create

consistency; its five SRLs

translate assessment into

operational action; its

priority levels establish

response timing; and its Quality Assurance steps carry the report forward after immediate securing actions. The process establishes an important

distinction: making the operation safe immediately is only the beginning.

After securing actions are completed, the organization must assess,

communicate, monitor, pause, suspend, or cease as required, investigate

the underlying condition, implement appropriate corrective action, and

verify effectiveness through monitoring and follow-up. That continuous

path from report to verified action makes the 10×10 framework a stronger

tool for proactive, evidence-informed, and accountable aviation safety

management.

OffRoadPilots