COVID-19 AND BIRDS
By OffRoadPilots
An examination of Canadian aircraft-movement and reported bird-strike
data indicates that the total number of bird strikes declined during the
COVID-19 period, while the number of strikes relative to aircraft activity
increased. Between August 1, 2016, and February 29, 2020, approximately
20,159,460 aircraft movements and 3,378 bird strikes were recorded. This
represents about 1.68 reported bird strikes per 10,000 aircraft movements.
Between March 1, 2020, and February 28, 2021, aircraft activity declined to
approximately 3,558,839 movements, while 952 bird strikes were recorded.
Although the absolute number of strikes was lower, the COVID-period rate
increased to approximately 2.68 strikes per 10,000 movements. The
exposure-adjusted bird-strike rate was therefore about 60 percent higher
during COVID-19 than during the pre-COVID period.
These results demonstrate why absolute numbers should not be
considered independently from operational exposure. The reduction from
3,378 strikes before COVID-19 to 952 during the selected COVID-19 period
could initially be interpreted as an improvement. However, the two periods
are of different lengths, and aircraft activity declined substantially during
the pandemic. When strikes are measured against movements, the data
present a different safety picture. Aircraft were involved in fewer strikesoverall, but each movement was exposed to a higher reported strike rate.
The reduced strike total therefore should not automatically be treated as
evidence that the underlying wildlife hazard was reduced.
COVID-19 created exceptional operational conditions at Canadian airports.
Commercial passenger traffic declined sharply, schedules were reduced,
and some aviation activities were suspended. At the same time, birds and
other wildlife continued to occupy and move through airport environments.
Reduced aircraft activity, vehicle traffic, construction, maintenance, noise,
and human presence may have made some airfield areas more attractive
to wildlife. Grasslands, drainage areas, standing water, food sources,
insects, nesting sites, and nearby waste or agricultural activities remained
capable of attracting birds even when aircraft movements declined. The
wildlife hazard did not necessarily decrease at the same rate as aviation
activity.
The higher ratio may also reflect limitations placed on airport personnel
during the pandemic. Public-health requirements, staffing reductions,
isolation rules, restricted access, modified shifts, physical-distancing
procedures, and financial pressures may have reduced the time that
qualified personnel could spend on the airfield. Some employees may havebeen assigned only to functions considered immediately essential. Wildlife-
control patrols, habitat inspections, grass management, drainage checks,
dispersal activities, carcass searches, fence inspections, and follow-up
investigations may consequently have been reduced, delayed, or performed
less consistently.
Functioning Safety
Management System
should identify such
operational changes
through hazard
identification and
management-of-change
processes. COVID-19 was
not merely a public-health
issue; it represented a
major change to airport staffing, supervision, traffic composition,
contractor availability, maintenance capacity, and airfield access. An
effective SMS should have assessed how these changes could influence
wildlife hazards and should have introduced temporary controls. These
controls could have included minimum wildlife-patrol requirements, revised
inspection schedules, prioritized habitat management, alternate staffing
arrangements, increased pilot reporting, and regular review of strike rates
per aircraft movement.
Pandemics were not considered . A Safety Management System is the organizational framework intended to recognize hazards, assess risk, implement controls, and verify whether
those controls remain effective. A defensible conclusion is that restrictions
affecting the people responsible for operating the SMS and completing
airfield work may have weakened some wildlife-risk controls. If staffing and
access restrictions prevented personnel from conducting normalinspections, dispersal, maintenance, reporting, and assurance activities, the practical effectiveness of the SMS could have been diminished, even though documented policies and procedures remained in place.
An SMS cannot manage wildlife only through manuals, forms, meetings, or
computer records. Its effectiveness depends on trained people being able
to observe conditions, enter the movement area, recognize changing
wildlife behaviour, remove attractants, disperse birds, report hazards, and
confirm that corrective actions work. When personnel are restricted from
performing these duties, there can be a gap between the SMS as
documented and the SMS as actually implemented. During COVID-19, this
gap may have allowed hazards to develop or remain uncontrolled for longer
periods, contributing to a higher strike rate per movement.
The change in traffic composition should also be considered. During the
pandemic, local movements, flight training, cargo operations, medical
flights, and other essential activities did not necessarily decline at the same
rate as scheduled passenger services. Different aircraft types, routes,
operating times, runway-use patterns, and flight profiles may have different
wildlife exposure. A larger proportion of local circuits, for example, could
produce repeated exposure to the airport environment. Consequently, the
higher ratio may reflect both reduced wildlife-control capacity and changes
in the kinds of movements that continued during the pandemic.
Reporting practices represent another possible influence. If pilots, air
operators, or airport personnel became more attentive to wildlife during
reduced traffic, a larger proportion of strikes may have been reported.
Conversely, staffing disruptions could have reduced reporting or carcass
detection.This experience provides an important SMS lesson. A major reduction in
operations does not necessarily produce a proportional reduction in risk.
When activity decreases, management may assume that fewer flights
require fewer safety resources. The COVID-19 data suggest that this
assumption can be misleading. Wildlife hazards can remain constant or
intensify while the operational denominator declines. Safety resources
should therefore be based on the condition and persistence of the hazard,
rather than solely on traffic volume. Minimum airfield surveillance and
wildlife-management capability should be maintained whenever aircraft
continue operating.
It is reasonable to conclude that bird-strike numbers were reduced during
COVID-19, while the reported bird-strike rate increased from approximately
1.68 to 2.68 strikes per 10,000 movements. This increase may have been
influenced by reduced human presence and restrictions that limited normal
wildlife-control and airfield-maintenance activities.
The aviation industry can improve its Safety Management System by
treating pandemics and other long-term emergencies as foreseeable
operational changes rather than temporary interruptions. Emergency
planning should identify the safety functions that must continue regardless
of passenger volume, staffing pressures, public-health restrictions, or
financial conditions. Wildlife monitoring and control should be classified as
essential airfield activities because birds remain present even when aircraft
movements decline.
Each airport should establish minimum service levels for wildlife patrols,
runway inspections, dispersal activities, carcass searches, grass cutting,
drainage maintenance, waste control, and fence inspections. These
requirements should be based on wildlife risk, seasonal migration, habitatconditions, and aircraft exposure—not only on the number of scheduled
flights. Qualified backup personnel should be trained in advance, and
agreements with neighbouring airports, contractors, or government
agencies should provide additional support when regular employees are
unavailable.
The management-of-
change process should be
activated as soon as an
emergency affects
staffing, airfield access,
traffic composition,
maintenance, or contractor
availability. A documented
Risk assessment should
determine how each
restriction could weaken
existing wildlife controls.
Any reduced inspection or patrol must be formally assessed, authorized,
time limited, and supported by alternative measures. Managers should
regularly review whether temporary controls remain effective instead of
allowing emergency arrangements to become normal practice.
Pandemics were considered.
Airports should monitor both the number of wildlife strikes and the rate per
10,000 aircraft movements. Monthly rates should be compared with
equivalent seasons and historical limits. The analysis should separate
local, itinerant, commercial, cargo, and training movements where practical
because different operations create different exposure. Leading indicators
should include patrol completion, wildlife observations, dispersal
responses, habitat deficiencies, overdue maintenance, and time required to
close corrective actions.Technology can support continuity through remote cameras, radar,
acoustic detection, drones where authorized, digital inspection records, and
automatic alerts. However, technology should supplement, not replace,
trained personnel who can inspect conditions, interpret wildlife behaviour,
and take immediate action.
Reporting systems must remain accessible during emergencies. Pilots, air
traffic services, maintenance staff, and contractors should receive
simplified procedures for reporting strikes, near strikes, wildlife
concentrations, and unavailable controls. Regular virtual safety meetings
can help share emerging trends among airports and operators.
Senior management should define clear authority, resources,
communication channels, and escalation thresholds so frontline personnel
can respond without unnecessary administrative delay.
Emergency exercises should include prolonged staff shortages and
restricted airfield access, not just short-duration events. After each
exercise or real emergency, the organization should document lessons,
update its wildlife-management plan, and verify corrective actions through
safety assurance. The central principle is that reduced traffic does not
necessarily mean reduced risk. A resilient SMS preserves essential human
capability, continuously measures exposure, and adapts wildlife controls
before temporary restrictions create a lasting safety weakness.
OffRoadPilots
