Self Evaluation of SMS

Self Evaluation of SMS

By Catalina9

Self Evaluation of your SMS is a hot topic these days. The question is how an operator really is capable, without bias, of evaluating their own Safety Management System, or operational processes. The answer is, they are not. Yes, they might be able to comply with the regulatory requirement, but no matter what emotional rationale is applied, it doesn’t fit the principles of SMS. The more logic that is used as arguments that an operator, being airport or airline, is capable to fairly assess their SMS, the more emotions they are putting into their arguments. An SMS that implies emotions becomes its worst enemy. Unless an operator is capable of comprehending the answer to the following question, they are operating with a check-box SMS only, to satisfy the Regulator. This is the same question as posted before: “Why does the Global Aviation Industry, being Airlines or Airports, need a Safety Management System (SMS) today, when they were safe yesterday without an SMS?”

SMS is the compass to success

One of the reasons why this question must be answered it to define the purpose of the SMS and goal achievements activities. Without a purpose, goal achievement activities and safety motivation is without context. The question is not applicable as a bulk question to any and all operator, but is applicable to each individual operator’s demand. One SMS requirement is for an operator, being airline or airport, to have in place process for setting goals for the improvement of aviation safety and for measuring the attainment of those goals. Without a purpose goals cannot be established. Making operations safer is not an improved purpose, since operations were safe yesterday without the SMS. Unless operators are meeting this requirement their Goal Setting system does not conform to regulatory compliance. Goals must be defined, specific and believable. Without a goal achievement plan the operator is setting all principles of SMS up for failure.

SMS is nothing else but hard work for everyone involved. It was incorrectly sold to the aviation industry as a system that magically would solve all problems and eliminate all accidents. This fact can easily be tested by conducting an operational risk-assessment analysis with the operator accepting one accident annually. Turn this risk assessment in to the Regulator for acceptance and see what response you get. So far, since the beginning of SMS, the Regulator does not accept an operator at a risk level accepting one accident annually. This fact is a contributing factor to a biased self evaluation of the operational SMS. An operator, when conducting their self evolution, must therefore conduct a biased self-evaluation and ensure that they have checked the box not accepting accidents. Yes, nobody wants accidents to happen on their watch.  However, who is capable to foresee the future with a risk assessment that ensures there are no accidents ever. The only way SMS can function effectively, and an operator can conduct their own self-evaluation without biased, is when they are allowed to operate in an environment with a risk-level accepting accidents. That’s the only way an operator can take actions to prevent accidents.

Today, automation in aviation is trusted to be flawless and operate in an accident free environment. The manufacturer fully believing that their automated systems are fail-free, and perfect. Because it is about automation, nobody is allowed to question if this automation have flaws. Since nobody knows there are flaws in automation, nobody can make changes to improve. Human errors don’t dissipate by removing operational controls from the Captain of an aircraft. Human errors are constant and transferred to the operational system taking over the Captains control. The automation is more precise in aircraft control than a person, but this does not remove human error. All it is, is that human errors are transferred from the Captain controlling the aircraft to the person designing the software system for automation.  SMS can only work when the industry accepts that you can find human performance limitations in the software systems just as much as in the hands of a Captain.

Several years ago, when a young NDT inspector found a flaw in the CT disk of an aircraft engine, that person was removed from the NDT process. The reason for not accepting that this flaw was real, was that the process of manufacturing the CT disk was viewed as being fail-free and without flaws. About a decade later, but not related directly, an aircraft engine failed in the skies above the MidWest fields and a finding with a similar cause of failure. The following statement is NTSB finding: “The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inadequate consideration given to human factors limitations in the inspection and quality control procedures used by United Airlines' engine overhaul facility which resulted in the failure to detect a fatigue crack originating from a previously undetected metallurgical defect located in a critical area of the stage 1 fan disk that was manufactured by General Electric Aircraft Engines.” We are now at the same stage in aviation history where automation is viewed as fail-free just because it is more precise in aircraft control.

Self evaluation is nothing else but to undo the final result

SMS is nothing else but hard work, but operators, being airlines or airports, expects SMS to be the magic want that prevents accidents. If this was not the fact, nobody would be surprised of the recent airplane crashes. Operators hire pilots as Captains, they hire accountants to manage their cash, they hire lawyers to eliminate litigation, but the only requirement to hire somebody as their SMS Manager or Director of Safety to operate the SMS system is that they are willing to accept the title.  

The future of SMS is how self-evaluation is conducted. An operator can effectively conduct their own unbiased self-evaluation, by implementing their required SMS daily quality control systems.

Catalina9