SMS AND VIKING VOYAGES

SMS AND VIKING VOYAGES

By OffRoadPilots

An Aviation Safety Management System (SMS) provides a structured way

to identify hazards, assess risks, introduce controls, and determine whether

those controls work. Its purpose is to support sound decisions before harm

occurs and improve operations through continuous learning. The Vikings

called their SMS “Sail My Seas”. Viking voyages offer a useful historical

analogy: crews crossed unfamiliar waters where weather, navigation,

vessel condition, supplies, and human judgment could determine survival.

Applying SMS principles to those journeys illustrates how leadership and

organized learning can strengthen safety. This is a hypothetical

comparison, rather than a claim that Vikings operated a formal SMS

resembling modern aviation systems.

The Vikings’ extensive voyages demonstrate the importance of managing

uncertainty. Norse expansion across the North Atlantic connected distant

communities and reached places including Iceland, Greenland, and North

America. Such journeys required practical seamanship and adaptation to

demanding environments. However, reaching a destination would not

necessarily prove that every decision was sound. A vessel could survive

despite weaknesses in planning or preparation. Aviation organizations facethe same problem when successful flights conceal deteriorating safety

margins. SMS encourages leaders to examine how an operation succeeded

and whether its success can be repeated safely under different

circumstances.

Leadership would be the starting point for a Viking SMS. The expedition

leader would establish that protecting people and preserving the vessel

were essential responsibilities. Departure decisions would consider

readiness alongside commercial ambitions, exploration goals, and

seasonal pressures. Crew members would understand their duties,

reporting arrangements, and authority to raise concerns. In aviation,

executives similarly need to provide resources and support operational

decisions consistent with safety objectives. 

A policy becomes meaningful when leaders accept delays, repairs, or changes to plans because available evidence shows that proceeding would expose people to unacceptable

risk.Hazard identification would begin before departure and continue

throughout each voyage. Viking crews could examine damaged planking,

worn rigging, unstable cargo, insufficient drinking water, inexperienced

sailors, and uncertain landing conditions. They could also identify external

hazards such as storms, fog, cold water, rocky shorelines, and limited

shelter. The aviation equivalent includes aircraft defects, runway

contamination, adverse weather, fatigue, and inadequate operational

information. Identifying a hazard does not require an accident. A small leak,

confusing instruction, or repeated navigation disagreement can reveal a

developing problem while there is still time to intervene.

Risk assessment would help distinguish manageable concerns from

conditions requiring immediate action. A weakened sail might create

limited difficulty near shelter but become critical during a long ocean

crossing. Its significance depends on exposure, available alternatives, and

the possible consequences of failure. Viking leaders could compare those

factors before choosing to sail, repair, reduce cargo, or change routes.

Aviation SMS applies similar reasoning when evaluating hazards within a

particular operation. Risk ratings should guide discussion and decisions,

while uncertainty, interacting hazards, and the limits of available evidence

remain visible to those accepting the risk.

Risk controls would need to match the actual danger. Viking measures

could include inspecting hulls and rigging, securing cargo, carrying repair

materials, preserving supply reserves, and choosing departure conditions

appropriate to the vessel and crew. Assigning experienced sailors to critical

duties would provide another protective measure. Aviation uses

comparable layers through maintenance, training, operating procedures,

weather assessment, and contingency planning. Several controls can

strengthen resilience, but their independence matters. Multiple precautionsoffer little protection when all depend on one exhausted person recognizing

the same warning at the same moment.

Human factors would deserve particular attention. Cold, hunger, fatigue,

fear, and social pressure could reduce a sailor’s ability to observe

conditions and make sound decisions. A respected leader might

unintentionally discourage disagreement, especially if hesitation appeared

inconsistent with courage. An SMS approach would make speaking up part

of competent seamanship. Aviation crews likewise need working

conditions that support alertness, communication, and constructive

challenge. Courage should include acknowledging uncertainty and

requesting assistance. Confidence is useful when supported by

competence; it becomes hazardous when authority prevents others from

questioning assumptions or reporting deterioration.

Reporting would turn individual observations into shared knowledge. After

a voyage, crews could discuss unexpected currents, damaged equipment,

supply shortages, navigational uncertainty, and difficult approaches toshore. Successful journeys would also deserve review, particularly when

survival depended on improvisation or favourable conditions. Aviation

organizations can learn similarly from hazards, incidents, diversions, and

other operational experiences. A fair reporting environment encourages

honest accounts while retaining accountability for deliberate misconduct.

Reports need timely responses and practical follow through, so personnel

can see that their information contributes to better decisions and safer

working conditions.

Investigation would look beyond the final mistake. If a vessel approached

dangerous rocks, asking only who steered would miss potential

weaknesses in lookout duties, fatigue management, route knowledge, or

leadership instructions. The useful question would be why the crew’s

protections failed to detect and correct the danger. Aviation investigations

benefit from the same systems perspective. Corrective action should

address underlying conditions rather than depend entirely on reminders to

be careful. Otherwise, the organization may replace one person while

leaving the circumstances that could expose another person to the same

failure.

Safety assurance would establish whether improvements worked. Viking

leaders could compare recurring defects, supply consumption, injuries, and

difficulties reported across successive voyages. They could check whether

inspections actually detected damage and whether revised preparations

reduced problems. Aviation organizations use monitoring, reviews, and

audits to evaluate operational controls. An absence of accidents alone

provides limited assurance, especially where activity is infrequent or

consequences are rare. Managers need evidence that safeguards function

during everyday operations and that corrective actions remain effective

after initial attention fades.Training and knowledge sharing would preserve learning beyond a single crew. 

Experienced sailors could demonstrate repairs, explain warning

signs, rehearse emergencies, and prepare less experienced members for

demanding duties. Oral teaching and practical demonstration could serve

this purpose without assuming modern documentation existed. Aviation

adds controlled procedures, records, and formal instruction, but the

objective remains transferable understanding. Personnel should know why

precautions matter and how to respond when circumstances change,

rather than simply memorize instructions.

Change would require renewed assessment. A different vessel, unfamiliar

route, heavier cargo, or inexperienced crew could invalidate assumptions

drawn from earlier voyages. Modern aviation faces comparable changes in

equipment, staffing, destinations, and schedules. Before proceeding,

leaders should examine new hazards, confirm resources, and decide

whether existing controls remain adequate.Emergency preparation would also matter. Crews could assign responsibilities for taking in water, losing steering control, or seeking

shelter. Aviation organizations similarly need coordinated responses to

foreseeable emergencies, supported by practice and clear communication.

Preparation improves the ability to respond effectively when prevention

proves insufficient.

The central lesson is that achievement and safety require continuing

human judgment. SMS could have helped Viking voyagers organize

experience, challenge risky assumptions, and protect future expeditions.

For aviation leaders, its value lies in making hazards visible, supporting

responsible decisions, and verifying that protections work. Technology can

assist this process, but people must remain accountable for understanding

conditions and acting before preventable harm occurs.

Viking voyagers can be understood as practising an early, informal

equivalent of an SMS (Sail My Seas) by sharing their experiences with

others preparing to sail. Knowledge about dangerous waters, changing

weather, ship weaknesses, crew fatigue, and unfamiliar destinations could

help the next crew recognize hazards and make better decisions. Sharing

both successful practices and mistakes turned individual experience into

collective learning. Although this was not a formal SMS in today’s sense, it

illustrates an enduring safety principle: lessons from one voyage can help

protect those setting out on the next.

OffRoadPilots